

**NPS ARCHIVE**  
**1998.12**  
**CALHOUN, T.**



DUDLEY LIBRARY  
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
MONTEREY, CA 93943-5101





# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

## Monterey, California



## THESIS

**EVALUATING SECURITY ASSISTANCE  
PROGRAMS: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND  
THE EXPANDED INTERNATIONAL MILITARY  
EDUCATION AND TRAINING  
(E-IMET) PROGRAM**

by

Todd R. Calhoun

December 1998

Principal Advisor:

Nancy C. Roberts

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.



**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE***Form Approved*  
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.

**1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)****2. REPORT DATE**  
December 1998**3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED**  
Master's Thesis**4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE** EVALUATING SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND THE EXPANDED INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING (E-IMET) PROGRAM**5. FUNDING NUMBERS****6. AUTHOR(S)**  
Calhoun, Todd R.**7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, CA 93943-5000**8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER****9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)****10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER****11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

**12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.**12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE****13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)**

In 1991 the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program was expanded to include training programs focusing on civilian control over the military, respect for human rights, and responsible defense resource management. In 1993 Congress institutionalized the federal government's commitment to performance measurement by signing into law the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). GPRA requires the Departments of State and Defense to *demonstrate* the results achieved by programs such as Expanded IMET (E-IMET). The purpose of this study is to address how the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) can tackle the challenge of measuring the effectiveness of the E-IMET program. A spectrum of approaches exists to evaluate public programs and is anchored on one end by the "technically rational paradigm" and on the opposite end by the "politically rational paradigm." By organizing the security assistance objectives of key E-IMET stakeholders into a Global Hierarchy the researcher was able to link the E-IMET program to national level goals, creating an objective baseline from which to measure the performance of the program. Individual objectives hierarchies were then created for each E-IMET objective and performance indices were proposed to meet the requirements of the GPRA mandate.

**14. SUBJECT TERMS**  
Security Assistance, Performance, Evaluation, Measurement**15. NUMBER OF PAGES**

171

**16. PRICE CODE****17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT**  
Unclassified**18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE**  
Unclassified**19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT**  
Unclassified**20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**  
UL





**EVALUATING SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS:  
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND THE EXPANDED  
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING  
(E-IMET) PROGRAM**

Todd R. Calhoun  
Captain, United States Marine Corps  
B.A., Miami University, Ohio, 1993

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
December 1998**

Author



Department of Systems Management

998.12  
ALHOUN, T.

~~1876~~  
C.1

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY  
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE  
MONTEREY, CA 93943-6101

## ABSTRACT

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY  
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
MONTEREY CA 93943-5101

In 1991 the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program was expanded to include training programs focusing on civilian control over the military, respect for human rights, and responsible defense resource management. In 1993 Congress institutionalized the federal government's commitment to performance measurement by signing into law the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). GPRA requires the Departments of State and Defense to *demonstrate* the results achieved by programs such as Expanded IMET (E-IMET). The purpose of this study is to address how the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) can tackle the challenge of measuring the effectiveness of the E-IMET program. A spectrum of approaches exists to evaluate public programs and is anchored on one end by the "technically rational paradigm" and on the opposite end by the "politically rational paradigm." By organizing the security assistance objectives of key E-IMET stakeholders into a Global Hierarchy the researcher was able to link the E-IMET program to national level goals, creating an objective baseline from which to measure the performance of the program. Individual objectives hierarchies were then created for each E-IMET objective and performance indices were proposed to meet the requirements of the GPRA mandate.

vi



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION .....	1
A.	BACKGROUND .....	1
1.	Security Assistance .....	1
2.	Post-Cold War Security Environment .....	1
3.	IMET and E-IMET .....	2
4.	Results Oriented Emphasis for Security Assistance and Government.....	4
B.	STATEMENT OF PROBLEM.....	6
C.	RESEARCH QUESTIONS .....	7
D.	OBJECTIVE .....	7
E.	METHODOLOGY .....	7
F.	ORGANIZATION OF STUDY.....	8
II.	LITERATURE REVIEW .....	11
A.	PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR .....	11
1.	Measurement System Defined .....	11
2.	Differentiating Between Process and Results-Oriented Systems .....	12
3.	Purpose of Performance Measurement .....	13
4.	Who Needs the Information Provided by Performance Measurement.....	15
5.	Current Public Sector Utilization.....	15
6.	Problems Associated with Public Sector Performance Evaluation .....	17
7.	Summary .....	20

B.	PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT PARADIGMS .....	21
1.	The “Technically Rational Paradigm” .....	22
2.	The “Politically Rational Paradigm” .....	24
C.	CHAPTER SUMMARY .....	28
III.	METHODOLOGY .....	31
A.	INTRODUCTION .....	31
B.	RESEARCH FOCUS.....	31
C.	RESEARCH METHODS .....	32
1.	Unobtrusive Measures: Public Archival Data.....	32
2.	Specialized Interviews .....	34
D.	LINKING THE PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE MEASURE- MENT PROCESS TO DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS .....	36
E.	THE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT PROCESS AND E-IMET ...	37
1.	Step #1: Identifying the Key E-IMET Stakeholders.....	37
2.	Step #2: Identifying the Objectives of U.S. Security Assistance and the E-IMET Program.....	38
3.	Step #3: Developing Performance Indices for the E-IMET Objectives .....	39
F.	CHAPTER SUMMARY .....	41
1.	The Public Sector Performance Evaluation Process.....	41
2.	Limitations of the Study .....	41
IV.	DATA .....	43
A.	INTRODUCTION .....	43
B.	EXPANDED IMET STAKEHOLDERS .....	44

1.	Identification of Stakeholders .....	44
2.	Stakeholder Issues, Concerns, or Stakes.....	50
C.	THE STAKEHOLDER MAP .....	57
D.	CHAPTER SUMMARY .....	58
V.	ANALYSIS: PART I .....	61
A.	INTRODUCTION .....	61
B.	THE GLOBAL HIERARCHY .....	62
1.	Methodology .....	62
2.	Linking the E-IMET Objectives to the Global Hierarchy .....	70
C.	CHAPTER SUMMARY .....	71
VI.	ANALYSIS: PART II.....	73
A.	INTRODUCTION .....	73
B.	THE IMPORTANCE OF A BASELINE ASSESSMENT .....	73
C.	INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE FOR THE E-IMET PROGRAM.....	74
1.	Civilian Control Over the Military .....	74
2.	Improved Military Justice Systems.....	83
3.	Defense Resources Management .....	90
D.	THE BALANCED SCORECARD .....	99
1.	The Kaplan/Norton Balanced Scorecard .....	99
2.	The E-IMET Balanced Scorecard .....	100
E.	CHAPTER SUMMARY .....	103
VII.	CONCLUSION.....	105
A.	INTRODUCTION .....	105

B.	RESTATEMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS .....	106
C.	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS .....	106
1.	Challenges to Public Sector Performance Evaluation .....	106
2.	Factors Limiting Rational-Analytic Assessment .....	109
3.	The E-IMET Performance Evaluation System .....	111
4.	Implications of the E-IMET Performance Evaluation System ....	112
D.	RECOMMENDATIONS .....	113
1.	Recommendations for Further Action .....	113
2.	Recommendations for Further Study .....	114
APPENDIX. DEFINITIONS.....		117
LIST OF REFERENCES.....		121
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....		127
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....		131



## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Example of an Objectives Hierarchy .....	27
Figure 2.	Individual E-IMET Program Stakeholders .....	45
Figure 3.	State Department Security Assistance Stakeholders.....	47
Figure 4.	Defense Department Security Assistance Stakeholders .....	49
Figure 5.	The E-IMET Stakeholder Map .....	58
Figure 6.	Security Assistance Communications (DoD Perspective).....	60
Figure 7.	Security Assistance Objectives .....	68
Figure 8.	Civilian Control Over the Military Objectives Hierarchy .....	81
Figure 9.	Improved Military Justice Systems Objectives Hierarchy.....	89
Figure 10.	Improved Defense Resources Management Objectives Hierarchy .....	98
Figure 11.	Kaplan/Norton Balanced Scorecard Format and Example .....	101
Figure 12.	“(Country`s Name) Balanced Scorecard” Example.....	103



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The researcher would like to thank Dr. Francois Melese, Associate Professor, Defense Resource Management Institute, for providing the funding to conduct the various interviews required for this study.





## **I. INTRODUCTION**

### **A. BACKGROUND**

#### **1. Security Assistance**

Security assistance, as defined in its simplest terms, concerns the transfer of military and economic assistance products and services to foreign governments through sale, grant, lease or loan. Promulgated into law by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, security assistance includes the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, the Economic Support Fund (ESF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Peacekeeping operations, and the Commercial Export Sales program. Currently the Secretary of State has statutory responsibility for supervision and general direction of security assistance programs and the Secretary of Defense is responsible for implementing military programs through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).<sup>1</sup>

#### **2. Post Cold War Security Environment**

Recent world events such as the break-up of the former Soviet Union and Gulf War have caused a modification of U.S. security assistance goals. According to a 1997 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report,

---

<sup>1</sup> Until October 1, 1998, DSCA was known as the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA).

We now face challenges involved in NATO expansion, assisting the transition of former Communist countries, integrating China into the world economic system, reforming the United Nations and the World Bank, building a credible World Trade Organization, and attacking the menace of illegal drugs and AIDS. These events necessitate a careful rethinking of the programs, approaches, and activities at the U.S. government's disposal to advance its interests. At the same time, the current environment also affords the chance to reassess programs and activities on their merits and determine if they are relevant in today's world (GAO, 1997, p. 1).

Security assistance programs such as IMET focus upon the enhancement of democratic institutions worldwide. With the new emphasis on providing support for emerging democracies, a challenge facing policy makers in the Post Cold War environment is to assess the effectiveness of current security assistance programs.

### **3. IMET and E-IMET**

#### ***a. The IMET Program***

Section #541 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 defines IMET as a key component of U.S. security assistance that provides professional military education (PME) on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations (GAO, 1992). The Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations (CPFO) states that the overall goal of the program is to "improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources" thereby contributing to greater self-reliance (CPFO, 1998, p. 19). The intention is to provide a wide range of benefits to the U.S in terms of collective security, stability, and peace.

IMET is a program that, for a relatively modest investment, presents democratic alternatives to key foreign military and civilian leaders (CPFO, 1998). The IMET program's FY98 budget request was for a mere 50 million dollars, less than the

cost of *one* U.S. Air Force F-22 fighter jet.<sup>2</sup> In fact, funding for the entire international affairs budget (Federal Budget Function #150), which totaled \$18.1 billion in fiscal year 1997, constitutes only one percent of the federal budget and just three to four percent of federal discretionary funding (GAO, 1997). Funding for the international affairs account, however, has declined in real terms about 6% annually from 1992 to 1997 (GAO, 1997). Nineteen ninety-seven funding was 23% lower than 1992 levels (GAO, 1997). Additionally, Function 150 is slated to receive cuts of over 13% in real terms by 2002 (GAO, 1997).

Although international affairs programs such as IMET comprise a fraction of federal discretionary funding, “they are designed to influence world political and economic agendas” (GAO, 1997, p. 2).<sup>3</sup>

***b. The Expanded IMET Initiative***

IMET is expanding and taking new directions in response to the changing global political scene. Significant changes have taken place to align the program objectives with U.S. foreign policy interests in the post-Cold War environment. In 1991 the Congress amended the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act with the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, earmarking \$1 million of IMET funds to expand the IMET program. This initiative expanded existing IMET courses and implemented new training programs

---

<sup>2</sup> Currently the Air Force estimates that the F-22 fighter jet will cost roughly \$87 million each (Cole, 1993).

<sup>3</sup> According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 1997 discretionary outlays totaled approximately \$550 billion (CBO, 1997). Therefore, funding for Budget Function #150 equaled roughly 3% of all 1997 discretionary expenditures (GAO, 1997). The 1997 IMET appropriation of \$43.5 million only absorbed .24% of Function #150 funding, or less than .01% of total 1997 discretionary spending.

focusing on civilian control over the military, respect for human rights, and responsible defense resource management (U.S. Congress, 1991). Most importantly, however, the traditional IMET student population was “enlarged to include civilian personnel from non-defense ministries, officials from the legislative branch who deal with military matters, and personnel from nongovernmental agencies having defense-related interests” (Cope, 1995, p. 6). By 1998 approximately 25-30% of total IMET funding was dedicated to the E-IMET initiative (Verry, 1998).

*c. IMET and E-IMET: A Low-Cost Alternative*

In 1990, DSCA claimed that IMET is an effective, low-cost component of the global U.S. security assistance effort (Larson, 1993). “The IMET program has become one of the most cost-effective means for promoting U.S. interests and advancing security in the Asian-Pacific-Indian Ocean region and throughout the world,” confirmed the Commander-in-Chief Pacific in 1993 (Larson, 1993, p. 14). There is a belief among existing security assistance providers that the relatively small cost of programs such as IMET and E-IMET provides a return for U.S. objectives on a global scale and that over the years this return is far greater than the original investment.

**4. Results Oriented Emphasis for Security Assistance and Government**

According to SECSTATE Christopher in 1993,

The watchwords for security assistance are now empowerment, partnership, and effectiveness. Our foreign assistance programs will be result-oriented, not expenditure-oriented. Where scarce development resources cannot be used effectively, our assistance programs should be reduced or redirected. Our development assistance should be judged not on the basis of funds obligated but on the basis of results achieved, and the same applies to security assistance (Christopher, 1993).



Richard Moose, Under Secretary for Management in 1994, echoed the Secretary's words and cited the fact that the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 has become laden with competing and conflicting goals and objectives.

In a time of reduced budgets, it is more important than ever that our programs be reformed and our scarce resources be targeted accurately and used effectively. We cannot afford waste and inefficiency. We [must] shift our focus away from how we do things and toward what we are trying to accomplish—away from process toward results. We will set clearly understood goals by which our programs can be measured, and we will demand measurable results (Moose, 1994).

Two particular initiatives that are national in scope and demonstrate overall government emphasis on performance measurement are the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 and the Service Efforts and Accomplishments (SEA) Reporting initiative of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB).

Signed by President Clinton in 1993, the GPRA institutionalized the federal government's commitment to developing and deploying effective performance measurement and performance management systems based on agency goals and objectives. The Results Act requires all government agencies (except the Central Intelligence Agency and some very small agencies) to establish top-level goals and objectives, define how they intend to achieve those goals, and demonstrate how they will measure agency and program performance in achieving those goals (GPRA, 1993). Agencies are required to submit annual performance reports to Congress starting no later than March 31, 2000, comparing actual performance against agency plans (Epstein, 1996).

While GASB actions do not have the force of law like GPRA, their SEA Reporting initiative is recognized by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants for use in public financial reporting (Epstein, 1996). With SEA reporting, GASB has moved beyond standard monetary accounting into the realm of performance measurement. The SEA framework stresses outcomes and efficiency as well as inputs and outputs (Epstein, 1996). In short, GASB has recognized “that public accountability cannot be achieved only through traditional reporting of monetary information” (Epstein, 1996, p. 62). Performance reporting is also needed.

## **B. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM**

In this time of reduced budgets and evolving security assistance and performance review initiatives, the DSCA and the Departments of State (DoS) and Defense (DoD) are faced with the challenge of measuring the effectiveness and performance of their security assistance programs. How this is to be done remains an open question.

A 1992 GAO report exploring post-Cold War security assistance program changes highlighted the fact that the DoD and DoS had not yet agreed on a format or the type of information to be included in an assessment of the overall IMET program (GAO, 1992). DSCA initially noted that the success of the E-IMET initiative could not be measured for “at least another 5 years” (GAO, 1992). GAO recommended that the Departments of State and Defense jointly develop a system to evaluate the effectiveness of the E-IMET program.

## **C. RESEACH QUESTIONS**

The primary research question of this thesis is: **What could a performance evaluation system developed for the E-IMET program look like?**

Subsidiary research questions supporting this issue are:

1. What are the challenges to performance evaluation of public programs?
2. What factors unique to the political environment necessarily limit the application of rational-analytic assessment models when measuring costs and benefits of current security assistance programs?
3. Can a system be developed that balances the reality of the political bureaucratic process with the rationality of economic cost-benefit analysis?
4. What are the implications of implementing a performance evaluation system on current security assistance programs?

## **D. OBJECTIVE**

The objective of this thesis is to address how the DSCA and the Department of Defense can tackle the challenge of measuring the effectiveness and performance of their security assistance programs. Specifically, it will investigate potential methods for performance evaluation of the E-IMET program.

## **E. METHODOLOGY**

The following approach will be used during this study:

1. Identify a continuum of policy and program evaluation paradigms within the public sector performance evaluation literature.
2. Identify the key stakeholders of the E-IMET security assistance program and the objectives and goals of each.
3. Develop a Global Objectives Hierarchy for U.S. security assistance.

4. Interview members of the IMET and E-IMET management staff to validate the proposed objectives hierarchy.
5. Develop performance indicators for the E-IMET program.
6. Address the impact of the proposed evaluation methodology on the current E-IMET program.
7. Recommend a course of action that brings the E-IMET program in line with the federal government's mandate for performance review.

## **F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY**

Chapter I, *Introduction*, will present the focus of this study. It will introduce the IMET and E-IMET security assistance programs and discuss the challenges presented by the changing international security environment and the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act.

Chapter II, *Literature Review*, will present the purpose, current utilization, and future use of performance measurement in government. It will also explore the challenges of public sector performance evaluation and conclude with a description of the process that will be used to measure the effectiveness of the E-IMET program.

Chapter III, *Methodology*, will outline the research methodology used to conduct this study.

Chapter IV, *Data Collection*, will identify the stakeholders of the E-IMET program in order to inform the objectives setting process and enable the development of performance indicators.

Chapter V. *Analysis: Part I.* will identify each stakeholder's security assistance objectives in order to form a Global Objectives Hierarchy and create an objective baseline for future performance measurement efforts.

Chapter VI. *Analysis: Part II.* will propose various performance indicators for the E-IMET program.

Chapter VII. *Conclusion.* will summarize the researcher's findings and recommend a course of action for the implementation of an E-IMET performance evaluation system.





## **II. LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **A. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR**

Much of the existing literature pertaining to performance evaluation in the public sector explores the purpose, current utilization, implementation problems, and future use of performance measurement in government. In order to fully understand performance evaluation one must clearly define a measurement system, differentiate between process and results-oriented systems, recognize the purpose and need for a system, and appreciate the forces affecting its application.

#### **1. Measurement System Defined**

According to Halachmi and Bouckaert, a measurement system “consists of practices, procedures, criteria, and standards that govern the collection of data (input), the analysis of the data (throughput), and the compilation of the results into quantitative or qualitative forms (output)” (Halachmi and Bouckaert, 1996, p. 2). Greiner cites a 1992 GAO report that further breaks performance measurement into subsystems:

Program performance measurement is commonly defined as the regular collection and reporting of a range of data including:

- Inputs (dollars, staff, and materials),
- Workload or activity levels,
- Outputs or final products,
- Outcomes of products or services, and
- Efficiency-cost per unit output or output per unit cost, sometimes referred to as “productivity” (Greiner, 1996, p. 2).

This systems definition, including inputs, throughput, outputs, and outcomes, must also recognize factors that influence each subsystem. For instance, the input side is influenced by criteria and standards, the methods and frequency of collecting the data, and who is in charge of the collection (Greiner, 1996). The analysis, or throughput, is influenced by the techniques used to transform raw data into measures of performance. The nature of the results and how those results are communicated to users within an organization influence output (Greiner, 1996). Greiner concludes that the measurement of government performance requires the collection and reporting of data at each point along the causal chain—inputs, throughput (processes), outputs, and outcomes (Greiner, 1996).

Depending on the organization's objectives, agencies may have to use more than one kind of measurement of performance. Indeed, the multidimensional nature of many public sector activities demands the use of multiple performance measures. Thus, clearly identified agency objectives are central to the development of any performance measurement system.

## **2. Differentiating Between Process and Results-Oriented Systems**

The literature distinguishes between measurement systems that focus on results from those that focus on process. If desired results is the target, then process specifications are derived from the desired results (Halachmi and Bouckaert, 1996). With this focus, the purpose of the measurement system is to assess the attainment of the desired results, or *outcomes*, based on clearly defined agency objectives. Outcome measurement can be used in a retrospective role--to determine whether the expected

benefits of a public sector program have materialized (Smith, 1996). It can also be used in a prospective role--to guide future resource allocation decisions. A results-oriented system, therefore, attempts to measure the outcomes--or *effectiveness*--of a given program, and is the focus of this thesis.

A process-focused performance measurement system assesses efforts to reengineer agency processes in order to achieve greater *efficiency*. The focus is on the causal chain from inputs to outputs. Process-focused systems measure the productivity of inputs used to create *outputs* in various program processes. It is a “clinical approach” to management; one that is more concerned about the procedural aspects of the operation than the results of the operation (Halachmi and Bouckaert, 1996, p. 4).

### **3. Purpose of Performance Measurement**

Hatry states that the “ultimate purpose of performance measurements is to use the measurement information to help make improvements—whether to expand, delete, or modify programs” (Hatry, 1996, p. viiii). Greiner lists several practical reasons for implementing performance measurement: improvement of performance, of motivation, of communications, and of accountability (Greiner, 1996).

Improving performance is the most important application of performance measurement. “Performance measures can be used to enhance planning, budgeting, and service delivery by providing timely feedback of results” (Greiner, 1996, p. 19). The availability of performance information makes continuous reassessment and improvement possible. Enhancing motivation is possible when performance information is linked to incentives to stimulate employees. Performance information also encourages

communication between managers, government officials, and elected representatives (Greiner, 1996). Finally, performance data can be used to show various interest groups just what they are getting for their tax dollars. Indeed, regular performance reports can be viewed “as a way to keep the public involved in the process of government” (Greiner, 1996, p. 20).

An increasing number of critics have recognized that the federal government has developed two defects that are central to its existence: (a) it does not know how to tell whether many of the things it does are worth doing at all; and (b) when it does decide that something is worth doing, it does not know how to create and sustain a program capable of achieving the results it seeks (Quade, 1984). In other words, what government lacks is some sort of regulator that tells it when a program has ceased to be effective or could be made more efficient. With increasing emphasis on providing more value for money with limited resources, an assessment of performance is needed to inform the decision-making process and may ultimately become a matter of government survival (Greiner, 1996).

Many authors agree that information and knowledge, not land, labor, and capital, are the key resources in a “knowledge society.” Managing change and ensuring that informed decisions are made quickly requires timely and complete information on performance. “Without adequate measurement, managers and employees within the agency, other agencies and oversight bodies, interest groups, the public, or the courts may not be able to document changes in performance” (Halachmi and Bouckaert, 1996, p. 3).

#### **4. Who Needs the Information Provided by Performance Measurement**

The public management literature indicates that performance data is useful to many parties. Program managers need regular project performance information to identify where their programs are doing well, where not well, and to help identify improvement actions (Halachmi and Bouckaert, 1996). Staff needs this information to determine how well they are doing. The media and the public also need performance information in order to fully participate in a democratic government.

In government, performance measurement can be used by the legislature and within the staff function of various government agencies. Halachmi and Bouckaert write:

It can be a budget decision tool, determining where to allocate scarce funds to achieve the greatest impact. It can be used by senior managers to fine-tune the agency through corrective measures or to provide front-line employees with feedback about their performance. It can provide information for planning by suggesting which operations need to be re-engineered to be more effective and efficient. It can be a communications tool, informing clients of the level of service achieved. For clients, it can be a feedback tool, allowing them an opportunity to indicate how services meet or do not meet their needs (Halachmi and Bouckaert, 1996, p. 6).

The literature also emphasizes that all parties must understand the limitations as to what these data tell and what they do not tell, as performance measurement systems have many potential problems.

#### **5. Current Public Sector Utilization**

A 1992 GAO survey of 102 federal agencies found that all of them collected a wide variety of performance measures (Greiner, 1996). However, according to Greiner,

Such statistics often give a false impression of the scope and depth of the performance measurement efforts underway. The reported measurement activities often focus primarily on input and workload measures, and in many instances they involve only limited number of agencies and applications (Greiner, 1996, p. 14).

The 1992 GAO report agreed, stating that, although most agencies employed a variety of performance measures, substantive use of such information was limited. The GAO survey concluded that many federal agencies only collected outcome data for informational purposes and few used performance measures to facilitate the achievement of long-term objectives (Greiner, 1996).

Other authors have arrived at similar conclusions. Wholey and Hatry observe that “most reports on government performance still focus on resource expenditures and the quantity of services delivered...; few government agencies provide timely information on the quality and outcomes of their major programs” (Wholey and Hatry, 1992, p. 604). Cave, Kogan, and Smith add that in the public sector there is often “a need for greater attention to quality of output and customer service, and levels of service quality cannot be adequately proxied by physical output measures” (Cave, Kogan, and Smith, 1990, p. 10).

The performance evaluation literature concludes that current federal agencies have underutilized existing measurement systems. While performance data exists, agencies fail to use the information to motivate long-term mission accomplishment (Wholey and Hatry, 1992).



## **6. Problems Associated with Public Sector Performance Evaluation**

Understanding the lack of public sector performance evaluation requires an examination of the institutional, technical, and financial obstacles associated with any measurement system. These “types of obstacles have hampered (and continue to hamper) wider acceptance and application of performance measurement in the public sector” (Greiner, 1996, p.16).

### ***a. Institutional Obstacles***

Several common characteristics of American government contribute to the limited use of performance measurement in the public sector. First, political pressures often outweigh the impact of data in the bureaucratic decision-making process (Greiner, 1996). All too often performance measurement efforts carry less influence than the actions of powerful elected officials, interest groups, and agency officials.

The presence of multiple self-interested constituencies also makes it difficult—if not impossible—“to reach agreement on service goals and objectives that must proceed performance measurement” (Greiner, 1996, p. 21). The impact of multiple constituencies on public policy receives extensive treatment in the performance evaluation literature. For example, Hitch recognized that:

National objectives can only be some combination or distillation of the objectives of people who comprise (or rule) the nation; and we should learn to be skeptical and critical of the verbalizations and rationalizations that pass for national objectives (Hitch, 1960).

A 1993 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report concluded that, “if a program’s objectives cannot be determined, performance measures will always be



ambiguous, if not superfluous” (CBO, 1993, p. 5). Unlike the corporate model with a bottom line, differing objectives of multiple constituencies cannot all be measured via a single performance index (Boschken, 1994). In a plural society diverse constituencies want different things from their public services. They demand performance information concerning multiple, and often conflicting, objectives. Implementing a performance measurement system that satisfies each constituency is often impossible and represents a major obstacle to public sector performance evaluation.

Utilization of performance measures has also been unfamiliar to the management approach of many public sector managers. These managers are often unaccustomed to using quantitative data to aid decision-making. A related institutional obstacle to the acceptance of performance measurement is a government’s “political self-confidence” (Greiner, 1996, p. 17). Are administrators and managers willing to accept both bad and good reports? “The prospect of accurate performance information and increased accountability can be very threatening to some elected officials, managers, line personnel, and interest groups” (Greiner, 1996, p. 17).

These factors combine to form a lack of institutional readiness for performance evaluation.

***b. Technical Obstacles***

Numerous technical obstacles inhibit performance evaluation. Like institutional obstacles, these technical challenges represent significant impediments to the measurement process.

At the most basic level is the lack of a common definition of productivity—a key element of performance measurement. Greiner points out that no consensus exists on the definition of government productivity, let alone how it is to be measured (Greiner, 1996). Both measures of efficiency and effectiveness have inappropriately been identified as definitions of productivity.

Differentiating between output and outcome measures when measuring organizational productivity is a common problem. Output measurement traditionally refers to the quantity of the good or service provided, and is closely related to the concept of *efficiency* (Smith, 1996). Many agree that there is no shortage of quantifiable output indicators. Largely dependent on output, outcome refers to “the impact on society of a particular public sector activity,” and is closely related to the concept of *effectiveness* (Smith, 1996, p. 1). Unlike output, outcome is far more difficult to measure. As Smith points out, “although most public sector auditing bodies pay lip-service to the desirability of addressing effectiveness issues, they have found it difficult to put into practice the principles of outcome measurement” (Smith, 1996, p. 2). One reason that helps explain the difficulties with outcome measurement is the fact that many costs and benefits of various programs are non-quantifiable. The difficulties of systematically measuring the outcomes of governmental programs, like security assistance, greatly limit the use of performance measurement techniques.

Another technical obstacle to the adoption of performance measurement systems is the fact that government services typically require several different measures to adequately characterize their performance (Smith, 1996). The multifaceted nature of

individual government programs often means that performance cannot be captured by only one or two measures. Information overload, caused by multidimensional programs, often overwhelms potential users (Smith, 1996).

Other important obstacles limit the adoption and use of performance measurement systems. The lack of standards for judging government performance limits the utility of performance data. Agencies need a ready benchmark to measure their performance data against. Without it they may not be motivated to corrective action. Making performance data available in a timely fashion is also difficult. If data is to be useful, performance feedback must occur often and be consistent. In reality, however, the data collection process often involves tedious delays (Greiner, 1996).

### *c. Financial Obstacles*

Implementation of performance measurement systems can be very costly. In an era of budgetary constraint the availability of resources (staff time and dollars) for performance evaluation is often limited. As Wholey and Hatry point out, “the cost of performance monitoring must always be balanced against the value of performance monitoring in improving government performance and credibility” (Wholey and Hatry, 1992, p. 609).

## **7. Summary**

Performance measurement in public policy is complex and problematic. Public sector operations are multidimensional, possess multiple or poorly defined objectives, lack comparative standards, and often result in non-quantifiable outcomes. Thus, public sector performance evaluation cannot be solely scientific. It must take into account the

political pressures of powerful stakeholders, the lack of institutional readiness, and various technical obstacles. Attempts at measurement must concentrate not only on inputs, but also systematically on the entire value chain, including throughput and outputs. Public agencies must ultimately attempt to measure the effectiveness, or outcomes, of their programs.

Although some areas continue to pose problems for performance evaluation in government, many government functions are yielding to performance measurement systems. A spectrum of approaches to performance evaluation of public programs emerges. Anchoring one end of the spectrum is the “technically rational paradigm” that treats performance measurement as an objective, scientific aid to decision-making. Anchoring the opposite end of the spectrum is the “politically rational paradigm” that emphasizes the effect of political power on the measurement of performance. Each paradigm employs various analytical techniques to quantify data and measure performance.

## **B. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT PARADIGMS**

A paradigm is “a systematic statement of the basic assumptions, concepts, and propositions employed by a school of analysis” (Allison, 1971, p. 32). Approaches to public sector performance evaluation form a continuum from the “technically rational paradigm” to the “politically rational paradigm.”

## **1. The “Technically Rational Paradigm”**

The most widely used approach to public sector performance evaluation is the technically rational paradigm. Central to the application of this paradigm is the assumption that program objectives are clearly stated and costs and resulting benefits are measurable. Being able to weigh, measure, and quantify is essential to this type of policy analysis. Objectives consensus is required before any measures of effectiveness are developed. Its dominant appeal is that it would discipline public choice so that scarce public resources are rationally allocated to their highest valued uses (Byrne, 1987). Examples of well-documented technically rational techniques include economic cost-benefit analysis, performance ratios, and the linear programming model. This paradigm also includes traditional operations research techniques that address the problem of multidimensionality such as data envelopment analysis and multiattribute utility theory (Greiner, 1996).

Users of technically rational techniques, like cost-benefit analysis, within government fall generally into two groups; those who recognize decisions as necessarily imperfect and treat techniques like cost-benefit analysis as an organizing rather than a calculative framework for addressing problems, and those which see the technique as a way to establish formal criteria in government decision making (Byrne, 1987). Thus, a split emerges between those who use technically rational techniques as an informative aid to decision-making, and those who advocate their rigorous application in government. Critical review, however, suggests that the rigorous application of techniques like cost-benefit analysis has generated numerous problems.

One obvious problem is quantifying intangibles like quality of life or the value of a human life. As stated earlier, to proceed logically in this paradigm one must be able to weigh, measure, and quantify. There is an inherent bias to favor elements that are quantifiable—even if they are not relevant to the critical questions being asked. This shortcoming surfaces in the area of public policy. Because many public programs produce benefits that are not quantifiable, only their dollar costs are readily calculated. The result is an “impression of accuracy that does not exist but also the notion that solely that which is quantifiable is significant” (Hoos, 1972, p. 139). Applying economic cost-benefit analysis to public sector decisions risks the “distortion, and ultimately, superficial treatment of matters of the deepest consequence” (Hoos, 1972, p. xxix). The inevitable consequence of this urge to scientific objectivity is the tendency to treat the matter under study as though it was primarily economic and thus can be judged through technically rational analysis.

The existence of numerous political constituencies raises the issue of multiple objectives. Application of the technically rational paradigm assumes a consensus on objectives. In order to technically measure performance one must have a clear idea what it is that they are measuring, and to what their results will be compared. Getting competing constituencies to agree on a single set of objectives is often difficult. But agreement on a single set of objectives is only half of the problem. What, then, should the criteria be for selecting one alternative over another and for deciding whether performance has met the stated objectives? Assuming that quantifiable data exists, simply calculating a performance ratio does not yield the ultimate answer. The reality of



public sector policy analysis is that political pressures play a key role in the setting of objectives and the selection of performance criteria.

The true value, and main difficulty, of technically rational methods such as cost-benefit analysis is its forced concentration on the measurable elements rather than the whole. Through this “piece-meal fragmentation” or “sub-optimization,” analysts juggle the parts that they can handle (Hoos, 1972, p. 138). While measures of overall effectiveness remain difficult to quantify, and thus outside the realm of rigorous cost-benefit analysis, pieces of the overall puzzle may be within grasp. The goal, then, ought not to be a definitive solution but a reasonable one, founded on an informed understanding of the measurable sub-elements of the larger objective.

## **2. The “Politically Rational Paradigm”**

The Founding Fathers’ concerns for liberty resulted in a tripartite division of powers within the national government. This deliberately pluralist formulation is the source of many of the difficulties surrounding performance measurement in the public sector. The assessment of effectiveness requires specification of objectives against which outcomes can be measured. But whose objectives should be considered? Technically rational performance measurement models have “a tradition of defining ‘performance’ from the perspective of one stakeholder in particular” (Bovaird, 1996, p. 146). As a result, technically rational measurement systems are often totally at odds with their political environment.



*a. Multiple Objectives*

Public agencies that are owned and funded by democratic governments operate under political authority (Rainey, 1991). Multiple constituencies (stakeholders), such as interest groups, elected and agency officials, the media, legislative bodies, and the general public, heavily influence the exercise of that authority. The presence of multiple constituencies within the political system results in the pursuit of multiple, intangible, and often, conflicting, objectives (Rainey, 1991). As a result, performance evaluation becomes highly subjective.

To reach consensus on objectives, against which outcomes should be measured, all groups affected by the policy must share a common interest that outweighs their particular interests. The relative political power of each group, however, determines their impact on the objectives-setting process. Objectives consensus, therefore, is not objective or equally weighted, but rather a result of the power and bargaining skill among various stakeholders (Allison, 1971). A single set of objectives “results from compromise, conflict, and confusion [among] officials with diverse interests and unequal influence” (Allison, 1971, p. 162). As Smith points out,

It is rare to find consensus about what constitutes the objectives of a public sector program. Thus, in making a choice of outcome measures, the outcome measurer is implicitly reflecting the objectives of one group of stakeholders, possibly at the expense of another group. That is, no outcome measurement scheme can be free of values, and any evaluation of outcome must be in respect of a particular set of objectives (Smith, 1996, p. 9).

Bovaird agrees, stating,

“Performance” is not a unitary concept, within an unambiguous meaning. Rather, it must be viewed as a set of information about achievements of varying significance to differing stakeholders. Performance measures must always be viewed within a multidimensional framework, and should be expected to be multidimensional in their form and content. If they appear one-dimensional, it is likely to be because they are of limited relevance. In practice, no performance information is other than partial, imperfect, and indicative (Bovaird, 1996, p. 147).

A lack of consensus on program objectives is a common reality of the politically rational paradigm. When consensus does exist, it is a result of the political interaction among powerful stakeholders. The value of the paradigm lies in its recognition that public sector performance evaluation must first identify key stakeholders and their respective objectives before applying a technically rational measurement technique. The process of public sector performance measurement is thus broken-up into four stages:

1. Identifying Stakeholders;
2. Identifying Objectives;
3. Developing Performance Indices;
4. Applying technical rational performance measurement techniques.

***b. Identifying Stakeholders, Objectives, and Indices: The Objectives Hierarchy Approach***

A useful approach to systematically link key stakeholders and their respective objectives to performance indicators is the Objectives Hierarchy.<sup>4</sup> An

---

<sup>4</sup> The Objectives Hierarchy is the first step in Thomas Saaty’s Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). While the researcher will use the Objectives Hierarchy approach throughout this study to break broad objectives down into sub-objectives and specific attributes, the remaining AHP techniques will not be applied.

Objectives Hierarchy stratifies into levels the relevant stakeholders and their respective objectives. A Hierarchy can be used to work down from each agency's high level objective (e.g., overall organizational performance) to relevant sub-objectives, to specific attributes that characterize those sub-objectives, and finally to measurable characteristics that allows quantification of the desired attributes (Melese, Lowe, and Stroup, 1997). A simple example of an objectives hierarchy for the Department of State is illustrated in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Example of an Objectives Hierarchy

In practice there is no set procedure for generating the objectives, sub-objectives, and specific attributes to be included in a hierarchy (Saaty, 1980). It is important to remember, however, that the ultimate organizational goal (objective) needs to be identified and placed at the top of the hierarchy.

*c. Summary*

Disagreement on evaluative frameworks exists not only because of technical obstacles, but also as a consequence of underlying political divisions (Fainstein, 1987). As a result, performance measurement can never be entirely scientific. Decision-making is much less systematic and rational than commonly supposed. As an aid to decision-making, performance evaluation is far less objective than the technically rational paradigm presumes. An understanding of the “governmental machine” of organizational processes and political actors is required before a measurement system can be developed (Allison, 1971). It is imperative to identify the stakeholders, and to what extent objectives consensus exists, prior to adopting any technically rational performance index. The Objectives Hierarchy process is a useful approach to analyzing multiple agencies and their objectives.

**C. CHAPTER SUMMARY**

Public sector performance evaluation is complex and controversial. Measurement of program efficiency involves collecting and reporting on input, throughput, and output factors in an effort to improve agency processes. Assessing the effectiveness of a program requires measuring outcomes against stated objectives. Various government

reports and private scholars have remarked on the lack of results-oriented measurement in government. Many reasons have been proposed for this, including institutional, technical, and financial obstacles. Many practical reasons exist, however, for implementing performance measurement systems in government.

A spectrum of approaches to public sector performance evaluation exists within the literature. Anchoring one end of the spectrum is the “technically rational paradigm” that presupposes objectives consensus and treats performance measurement as a coldly objective and scientific aid to decision-making. On the other end is the “politically rational paradigm” that recognizes that objectives consensus, when it exists, is a result of political bargaining among multiple stakeholders. It emphasizes identifying stakeholders and their respective objectives as a preliminary step in the performance measurement process.



### **III. METHODOLOGY**

#### **A. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter will outline the methodology used to conduct this study. It will describe the selected research focus, the primary research methods used, and how the public sector performance evaluation process outlined in Chapter II is linked to the data collection and analysis stages of the study. The chapter will conclude with a detailed description of how each step in the public sector performance evaluation process was accomplished.

#### **B. RESEARCH FOCUS**

The objective of this thesis is to address how the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the Departments of State and Defense can tackle the challenge of measuring the effectiveness and performance of their security assistance programs. The researcher chose to focus on the Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET) military-to-civilian security assistance program due to the inherent subjective nature of international assistance efforts. A commonly held view within the security assistance community is that the effectiveness of security assistance programs cannot be measured with certainty due a lack of quantitative data, thereby making strict compliance with the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act impossible. It is the researcher's hypothesis, however, that objectively measuring the effectiveness of security assistance programs is possible. In order to place constructive limitations on the study,



and because it is the potential core of an evolving military-to-civilian security assistance effort, the researcher focused entirely on the E-IMET program.

In the spirit of the Results Act, any government agency and program could have been selected. DSCA was chosen as the central point of contact because it is organic to the Defense Department, is responsible for the implementation of the E-IMET program, and is faced with the same challenges as more traditional State Department security assistance organizations (i.e.,: The Agency for International Development (USAID)).

## **C. RESEARCH METHODS**

This study makes use of two common public administration research methods. The first is the collection of data through unobtrusive measures, specifically archival research, and the second is the collection and verification of data through specialized interviewing.

### **1. Unobtrusive Measures: Public Archival Data**

Webb et al. (1966) point out that archival sources of information have been widely used in public administration research for many years (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, and Sechrest, 1966). Archival sources of data are written materials that are available from public and private records (Yaeger, 1989). Public archives include “ongoing records of society, such as actuarial records, voting records, government budgets, and communications media, which are produced and paid for by someone other than the researcher” (Yaeger, 1989, p. 714). The archival data collected in this study come solely from public records.

Archival sources are further classified as primary or secondary. Primary public sources used in this study include speeches, congressional testimony, reports, and documents published by various U.S. government agencies. Examples include reports by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and agency-specific publications such as the National Military Strategy (DoD). Data collected from these primary public sources include formal organizational charts, missions, and objectives.

Secondary public sources include the published books, articles, studies, papers, and lectures of academics (Yaeger, 1989). Secondary sources are used in this study to inform the performance measurement process and provide the background information necessary to critically analyze the data collected from primary public sources. An example of a secondary public source is the *Public Administration Review*, the oldest of the public administration journals (Yaeger, 1989). Data collected from these sources helped form the continuum of performance evaluation paradigms described in Chapter II as well as the public sector performance measurement process used throughout this thesis. Secondary archival data also provided information critical to the development of the E-IMET performance indices found in Chapter VI.

Archival sources are not without problems, however. First, archives may contain errors or be incomplete (Yaeger, 1989). Second, some archival materials “suffer from selective deposit” (Yaeger, 1989, p. 720). Another common problem is that of selective survivability. This may happen with public sources when a political administration or agency removes records that reflect negatively upon the organization (Yaeger, 1989). While these problems might exist, the researcher took steps to limit their

effects. First, documents were checked for internal consistency. More importantly, multiple sources were used to ensure a fair picture emerged of a given issue. Agency-specific sources were compared to reports from other agencies, like the GAO, or to similar secondary sources. As will be described in the next section, key archival data were also verified through the specialized interview process.

While there is no complete assurance that the data offer a comprehensive representation of all the stakeholders, the researcher made every effort to incorporate archival data from all parties.

## **2. Specialized Interviews**

Interviews are frequently used to collect data and have been used throughout the history of public administration research (Yaeger, 1989). One type of interview, known as the elite or “specialized interview,” is used to collect data from a limited group of individuals or “key informants” (Yaeger, 1989, p. 698). Key informants are “individuals, who because of their position, are likely to have been involved either in making a decision of interest or in carrying it out” (Yaeger, 1989, p. 698). The special knowledge and experience that they have may enable them to comment on or verify the accuracy of the information gained during the course of the research project (Yaeger, 1989). With specialized interviews the number of subjects usually is limited. Rather than interviewing many subjects, key informants are selected because of the position they hold or because of their experiences.

In August 1998 the researcher traveled to Washington D.C. to interview various key E-IMET informants. An example of a key informant used in this study is Ms. Rita

Verry, head of the E-IMET program for DSCA. Specialized interviews with other selected officials within the E-IMET community were used to verify and help interpret various archival data. Data gathered during specialized interviews with various academic professionals at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), the Defense Resources Management Institute (DRMI), the International Health Resources Management (IHRM) Program, the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR), and the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) aided in the development of performance indicators for the E-IMET program.

Various specialized interview formats exist. The one used in this study was the nonscheduled or nondirective interview. In this type of specialized interview the questions asked of each subject are not necessarily the same and may “differ in significant ways depending on the different positions and experiences of each subject” (Yaeger, 1989, p. 699). No preconceived set of questions was developed in advance in order to encourage the respondents to describe their experiences and interpretations as freely as possible. The questions posed during this study were often open-ended and intended to get the subject to talk in his or her own terms about the E-IMET program. The data collected through these interviews took shape as the process went along, with tentative generalizations being tested in subsequent interviews of other subjects.

It is important to note that the key to conducting a specialized nondirective interview is sound background information. This is where the unobtrusive archival and the specialized interview research methods intersect to increase the adequacy, reliability, and representativeness of the data collected. Data gathered from archival material served

as the basis for the researcher's questions during the interviews. The interviews served as a way of verifying the researcher's generalizations concerning performance evaluation of the E-IMET program.

Like archival data, interview data are also not without errors. Potential problems include omission and underreporting, telescoping or overreporting, and lack of communication skills (Yaeger, 1989). These potential sources of error were overcome by the researcher through verification with other data sources and double-checking with the subject during the interview. Subsequent telephone interviews were also conducted when further clarification was needed.

#### **D. LINKING THE PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT PROCESS TO DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS**

The process of public sector performance measurement used in this thesis is broken down into four iterative stages:

1. Identify the Key E-IMET Stakeholders;
2. Identify the Objectives of U.S. Security Assistance and the E-IMET Program;
3. Develop Performance Indices for the E-IMET Objectives;
4. Apply technically rational performance measurement techniques.

The researcher will apply the first three steps of this process using data gathered from the two primary research techniques. Step #1 consists of data collection involving primary and secondary archival research. Step #2 continues the collection of archival data but concludes with the formation of a Global Objectives Hierarchy, thus moving the

study into the analysis stage and triggering the specialized interview process. The analysis stage will conclude with a set of proposed performance indicators for each of the three E-IMET program objectives and is heavily dependent on data gathered through specialized interviews and secondary archival sources. Step #4, actually measuring the performance of the program, is beyond the scope of this study. Conclusions will then be drawn from the experiences and insight gained from the application of the process.

## **E. THE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT PROCESS AND E-IMET**

### **1. Step #1: Identifying the Key E-IMET Stakeholders**

The purpose of this step is to identify and classify the key stakeholders of the E-IMET program. This process will take place in five sequential steps.

First, the concept of a stakeholder will be clearly defined using secondary archival sources. Internal and external E-IMET stakeholders will then be identified using primary archival sources including security assistance doctrinal publications. Once individual stakeholders have been identified, they will be grouped according to their parent governmental agencies and the stakes they share in the evaluation of E-IMET performance. For example, DSCA, which is identified as a key individual stakeholder, is grouped under its parent agency, the Department of Defense. The assumption here is that individual stakeholders within the same agency share common views on E-IMET performance evaluation and have similar effects on the E-IMET program.<sup>5</sup> This

---

<sup>5</sup> It should be noted that it is entirely possible that individual stakeholders could have different views and effects on a given program than their respective agency as a whole. Within a government agency, however, it is reasonable to assume that the parent organization (DoD) would, to a certain extent, govern the effects of their organic individual agencies (DSCA), thus making a generalization (grouping) possible.



assumption is made to simplify the analysis in order to remain within the time constraints of the study. The basis for this grouping will be the organizational charts found in the primary archival sources. Each group's stake in E-IMET program will then be discussed in order to better understand the effects that they have on the program's overall objectives. This is a very subjective step and will be informed by agency-specific documents and verified by subsequent specialized interviews. The last step in the stakeholder identification process is to formally organize the various stakeholder groups into a "stakeholder map" which will graphically present the potentially conflicting effects of the various stakeholders on E-IMET objectives consensus. This, too, is a subjective step, but will be informed by agency-specific documents and verified by subsequent specialized interviews.

## **2. Step #2: Identifying the Objectives of U.S. Security Assistance and the E-IMET Program**

The purpose of this step is to construct a broad Global Security Assistance Objectives Hierarchy that will serve as a basis for objective performance evaluation and link the three E-IMET objectives back to each of the Executive Branch stakeholders.<sup>6</sup> This process will take place in five sequential steps.

First, each stakeholder group's security assistance objectives will be outlined using official agency-specific documents. Once outlined, a subjective sifting process will

---

<sup>6</sup> Only Executive Branch stakeholder objectives were outlined in this study. While Legislative Branch stakeholders are identified and have a profound effect on the E-IMET program, they do not set specific Administration security assistance direction.

separate objectives from strategies (ends versus means) resulting in three separate agency-specific objective hierarchies. A Global Objectives Hierarchy will then be constructed using common Executive Branch stakeholder objectives. This Hierarchy will break broad national objectives down into sub-objectives and specific attributes that characterize those sub-objectives using the multiple objectives found in the existing individual hierarchies. While this process is inherently subjective it is more a function of pattern recognition among the separate stakeholder hierarchies. The next step is to validate the accuracy of the Global Hierarchy, as well as the objectives selection criteria used to construct it, through specialized interviews with key informants within the Defense Department and the State Department.<sup>7</sup> An opinion was also sought from Legislative Branch key informants even though their objectives are not specifically incorporated into the Hierarchy. Once validated, the final step in the objectives identification process is to link the specific E-IMET objectives to the Global Hierarchy. This last step forms the logical link between common national security assistance objectives and the E-IMET program.

### **3. Step #3: Developing Performance Indices for the E-IMET Objectives**

The next step in the public sector performance evaluation process, and the purpose of the last step in this study, is to propose indicators of performance for the three E-IMET program objectives. The three main objectives of the E-IMET program are:

---

<sup>7</sup> Representatives from the Executive Office of the President were unavailable for interview. Their national security assistance objectives are clearly defined in the National Security Strategy and the President's annual State of the Union Address, however.



1. Respect for Civilian Control Over the Military;
2. Improved Military Justice Systems and Procedures In Accordance With International Human Rights;
3. Improved Defense Resource Management.

This is the most critical and problematic step in the performance evaluation process. It involves identifying what qualities are inherent in each of the three objectives. Quantifiable indicators of performance must then be matched to the specific characteristic of the overall objective. In short, it requires a deep understanding of civil-military relations, military justice, and resource management.

This step relies heavily on the data received from specialized interviews conducted with the academic professionals from the Naval Postgraduate School, the Defense Resources Management Institute, the International Health Resources Management Program, the Center for Civil-Military Relations, and Defense Institute of International Legal Studies. The experienced opinions of these professionals, combined with data gathered from secondary archival sources, will help form individual objectives hierarchies for each E-IMET objective. These hierarchies will then be used to develop indicators of performance for the E-IMET program.

It is important to note that the result of the process is simply a starting point for further discussion. The indicators found in this study will be developed largely outside the influence of in-country security assistance officials. The researcher realizes that the inherently subjective nature of this process must be combined with informed country-specific data in order to yield the most beneficial measures of performance. The various

Security Assistance Officers (SAOs) who serve as the in-country point of contact for U.S. security assistance efforts were not interviewed for this study due to time and financial constraints. The performance indicators found in Chapter VI are a result of the critical analysis of the three broad E-IMET objectives and are meant as a starting point for the future development of country-specific performance indicators.

## **F. CHAPTER SUMMARY**

### **1. The Public Sector Performance Evaluation Process**

The four-step method to measure the performance of public sector programs is an iterative process utilizing data gathered through archival and interview research. While many steps in the process are largely subjective, a concerted effort was made to crosscheck and verify each assumption. Primary archival data was compared to similar secondary archival data and specialized interviews were used to verify all assumptions and generalizations based on archival material. While every effort was made to gather data that is representative, adequate, and reliable, limitations did exist.

### **2. Limitations of the Study**

The chief limitation of this study is the lack of past efforts to measure the effectiveness of security assistance programs. A standard evaluation format does not exist for security assistance programs. This created an enormous obstacle as the researcher was forced to break new ground concerning governmental program evaluation.

Another limitation placed on the study was the lack of access to various E-IMET stakeholders. While some stakeholders were very accessible (DSCA and the Department

of State especially), many were not. The face-to-face interviews used in this study were conducted during a congressional recess making it difficult to adequately represent the Legislative Branch's position. Representatives from the Executive Office of the President were also unavailable for interviews. Additionally, various in-country U.S. Embassy Security Assistance Officers were not contacted for their input concerning region-specific performance indicators.

## **IV. DATA**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The purpose of the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) is “to improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability by promoting a new focus on results, service quality, and customer satisfaction” (GPRA, 1993, p. 2). GPRA mandated that each government agency submit to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and to Congress a strategic plan for program activities (GPRA, 1993). When developing a strategic plan, GPRA requires that the agency “consult with Congress, and solicit and consider the views and suggestions of those potentially affected by or interested in such a plan” (GPRA, 1993, p. 3). In short, GPRA requires each agency to work with their internal and external stakeholders to set agency direction. Thus, it is essential to consider the various stakeholders that affect the agency or program before a set of overall objectives can be developed.

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the stakeholders of the E-IMET program. Once the stakeholders have been identified they will be grouped according to similar stakes and organized into an E-IMET stakeholder map. Chapter V will identify the security assistance goals (objectives) of each stakeholder group based on their written documentation (i.e.: The National Security Strategy) in order to inform the E-IMET objectives setting process and enable the development of performance indicators for the E-IMET program.


## **B. EXPANDED IMET STAKEHOLDERS**

### **1. Identification of Stakeholders**

Measuring the performance of the E-IMET program must begin with the identification of key stakeholders. Freeman defines a stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an organization’s purpose” (Freeman, 1984). To identify key stakeholders Roberts and King ask a simple question: “What are the key stakeholder groups that are affected by or can affect the policies and programs which you are attempting to introduce?” (Roberts and King, 1989, p. 68).

Descriptions of a stakeholder range from the highly specific to the general (Clarke, 1998). Stakeholders can be either internal or external to the organization or program (Roberts and King, 1989). They can also be potentially hostile or adversarial. Any group, internal or external, can potentially make a difference to the organization or program (Roberts and King, 1989). Once identified, individual stakeholders are grouped according to similar stakes and organized into an overall “stakeholder map” (Roberts and King, 1989).

The presence of multiple stakeholder groups may result in diverse or conflicting ideas concerning a program’s objectives. Thus, the careful identification of dominant stakeholders is the critical first step in defining a single set of objectives for a program. Figure 2 contains a list of the dominant individual stakeholders for the E-IMET program.



**Figure 2. Individual E-IMET Program Stakeholders**

**a. Executive Office of the President Stakeholders**

The primary stakeholder organization within the Executive Office of President is the **National Security Council (NSC)**. Chaired by the **President**, the function of the council is to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security (DISAM, 1994). The NSC publishes the *National Security Strategy of the United States* that outlines the Administration's core national security objectives and strategic priorities. This document contains the Administration's broad goals and objectives relating to security assistance (A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 1997). It is the NSC, with guidance from the President, that identifies core national security assistance objectives.

*b. State Department Stakeholders*

The **Secretary of State** provides continuous supervision and general direction for security assistance, including military education and training programs (DSCA Website, 1998). The Department of State (DoS) affects program determination and integration. It is the DoS that determines whether there will be an E-IMET program for a country and, if so, its scope (DISAM, 1994). The DoS of is also responsible for “ensuring that the programs are effectively integrated both at home and abroad, and that the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby” (DISAM, 1994, p. 79). To guide these decisions the Secretary of State develops international affairs strategic goals that are the foundation of the nation’s foreign policy (FY1999 Security Assistance Budget Request, 1998).


The **Under Secretary for International Security Affairs** is the principle advisor to the Secretary of State and the focal point for security assistance matters within the Department (DISAM, 1994). The Under Secretary chairs the **Security Assistance Program Review Working Group (SAPRWG)** which is the DoS’s principle advisory body with policy planning and review functions. As an interagency group with wide representation throughout the Executive Branch, the SAPRWG acts as the central security assistance policy-making body for the Secretary of State (DISAM, 1994).

The **Bureau of Political-Military Affairs** also plays a key security assistance role. It’s principle function is to advise the Secretary of State on issues and policy problems arising from areas where foreign policy and defense policy impinge on



one another (DISAM, 1994). The Bureau also plays a key role in the administration of the IMET program.

A diagram of the State Department's organizational security assistance stakeholders is provided in Figure 3.



**Figure 3. State Department Security Assistance Stakeholders**

*c. Defense Department Stakeholders*

The **Secretary of Defense** is responsible for implementing programs to transfer security assistance services. The Defense Secretary is responsible for the performance of all defense functions that furnish military assistance, education, and training (DISAM, 1994). Department of Defense (DoD) strategic guidance is published in the National Military Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

Authority and control over all DoD security assistance matters is delegated to the **Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**. The **Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (ASD/ISA)**, however, supervises security assistance programs with all foreign governments. Through the **Defense Security Cooperation**


**Agency (DSCA)**, the ADS/ISA “interprets executive policy and develops DoD security assistance policies and programs” (DISAM, 1994, p. 84).

The DSCA is established as a separate agency of the DoD under the direction and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and receives policy direction and supervision from ASD/ISA. DSCA handles many critical E-IMET functions including (DISAM, 1994);

- Administration and supervision of E-IMET planning and training;
- Coordination of the formulation and execution of the E-IMET program with other government agencies;
- Developing and promulgating E-IMET procedures.

Additional stakeholders exist within DoD. The **Joint Staff** organization determines the impact of security assistance programs on U.S. programs defense readiness, making it a key participant in the security assistance program development and review process (DISAM, 1994). The five **Unified Commands** are responsible for the conduct of the U.S. security assistance program within their respective regions (DISAM, 1994). They provide critical program evaluation “of the efficiency and effectiveness of DoD overseas security assistance programs” (DISAM, 1994, p. 87). Each **Military Department (MILDEP)** maintains a separate department responsible for the actual delivery of security assistance services and provides recommendations to the Defense Secretary on the successful conduct of security assistance programs.

A diagram of the Defense Department’s organizational security assistance stakeholders is provided in Figure 4.



**Figure 4. Defense Department Security Assistance Stakeholders**

*d. Legislative Branch Stakeholders*

**Congress** establishes the laws, authorizes the programs, appropriates the funds, and oversees the role that security assistance plays in international affairs. Specifically, the Congress has the power to (DISAM, 1994):

- Establish or amend basic security assistance authorization acts;
- Enact security assistance appropriation acts;
- Pass Joint Resolutions to permit the incurrence of obligations to carry on essential security assistance program activities until appropriation action is complete;
- Conduct hearings and investigations into special areas of interest, to include instructions to the General Accounting Office, Congressional Budget Office, and Congressional Research Office to accomplish special reviews;
- Ratify treaties that may have security assistance implications.

The basic congressional stakeholder organization is the committee. Traditionally, powerful **Authorization and Appropriation Committees**, as well as their respective **Subcommittees**, are the dominant stakeholders. These committees provide program oversight during annual hearings on fiscal year foreign operations spending. The key Authorization Committees include (DISAM, 1994):

- House International Relations Committee (HIRC)
- Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC)

The key Appropriation Subcommittees include (DISAM, 1994):

- House Appropriations Subcommittee for Foreign Operations (HACFO)
- Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations (SACFO)

## **2. Stakeholder Issues, Concerns, or Stakes**

Once the key stakeholders have been identified it is necessary to determine the “stake” each has in E-IMET effectiveness evaluation. According to Roberts and King,

A stake is the claim on the organization that each stakeholder has. The concept of a stake is based on the idea of one’s having something to lose or gain in a given situation, and therefore the nature of the stake depends on the issue at hand. Thus, the stake may be tangible (money, material, resources) or intangible (time, prestige, self-esteem), explicit or implicit. Moreover, a stake may be economic, political, social, or psychological in nature (Roberts and King, 1989, p. 66).

### ***a. The Grouping Process***

To simplify the analysis of stakes the individual stakeholders will immediately be placed into groups. Since the individual stakeholders are organic to higher level governmental agencies (i.e., DSCA is organic to the Department of

Defense) they can be grouped according to their formal organizational charts. It is assumed that since individual stakeholders are under operational and administrative control of their higher-level agency, they will possess a similar stake in the evaluation of the E-IMET program. It will then be possible to characterize the stakes of each group and construct an overall stakeholder map. The following stakeholder groups, along with their key individual stakeholders, have been identified for this study:

**The Executive Office of the President Group**

The President  
The National Security Council

**The State Department Group**

The Secretary of State  
The Under Secretary for International Security Affairs  
The Security Assistance Program Review Working Group  
The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

**The Defense Department Group**

The Secretary of Defense  
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)  
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency  
The Joint Staff  
The Unified Commands  
The Military Departments

**The Legislative Group**

The House International Relations Committee  
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
The House Appropriations Subcommittee for Foreign Operations  
The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee for Foreign Operations

*b. Stakes Analysis*

The following is a description of the stakes for each stakeholder group. It focuses on where each of the groups stands on the issue of E-IMET performance evaluation.

(1) **The Executive Office of President Group.** The President outlines his national security priorities every year in the State of the Union Address. In 1997 President Clinton cited the following security assistance priorities (National Security Strategy, 1997):

- Foster a peaceful, undivided Europe;
- Create a stable, prosperous Asia Pacific community;
- Be a force for peace;
- Maintain a strong military and superb diplomatic representation to meet all national security challenges.

It is the responsibility of the National Security Council to develop the national security strategy, implementing the priorities of the nation's Chief Executive. By setting national goals and objectives, the Council gives direction to DoS and DoD security assistance efforts. Thus, the Council has an implicit political stake in the effectiveness of security assistance programs like E-IMET. The degree to which a program like E-IMET helps accomplish presidential political priorities is of significant interest to the President's Executive Office. The NSC has a stake in measuring the E-IMET program's ability to accomplish the President's strategic priorities.

(2) **The State Department Group.** The State Department is responsible for overseeing the development and integration of various security assistance programs throughout the Executive Branch. The Department submits the annual Security Assistance Budget Request that supports each of the U.S. foreign operations programs. It also publishes the annual *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations (CPFO)* that supports the funding requests for international security assistance programs, including the IMET program. Since current E-IMET expenditures represent only a small portion of overall IMET funding, the State Department is concerned primarily with the broader IMET program (Bowab Interview, 1998). In 1998, the State Department claimed that the IMET program is an effective, low-cost component of the global U.S. security assistance effort (CPFO, 1999):

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is an instrument of U.S. national security and foreign policy—a key component of U.S. security assistance. It is a program that, for a relatively modest investment, presents democratic alternatives to key foreign military and civilian leaders (CPFO, 1999).

E-IMET funding, however, has been growing steadily as a percentage of IMET spending since the 1991 expansion of the IMET program.<sup>8</sup> The State Department, therefore, has a tangible stake in assessing the effectiveness of the E-IMET program. A favorable E-IMET performance evaluation would demonstrate to Congress the cost effectiveness of the overall IMET program. A rigorous performance

---

<sup>8</sup> In 1998, Congress specified that approximately 30% of total IMET funding should be dedicated to the E-IMET program (Bowab, 1998).



evaluation that yields unfavorable results, however, would be problematic in terms of future congressional support.

A favorable E-IMET performance evaluation also presents the State Department with a potential problem. In today's environment of fiscal constraint a positive performance evaluation could also be used to justify the expansion of the E-IMET program at the expense of traditional IMET training. For those who believe that the current focus on E-IMET training is taking away from the State Department's more traditional military-to-military IMET training, a positive review of the E-IMET program could cause an unwanted shift away from the IMET program.

(3) **The Defense Department Group.** The Defense Department is responsible for the implementation of congressionally funded military security assistance programs. Specifically, the DSCA is tasked to provide the services associated with the E-IMET program. The Secretary of Defense's Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Joint Staff's National Military Strategy outline a security strategy of engagement for the Defense Department and provide a mission for DSCA (QDR, 1997). DoD's strategy of engagement emphasizes the role of security assistance in shaping the changing global security environment.

A strategy of engagement presumes the United States will continue to exercise strong leadership in the international community, using all dimensions of its influence to shape the international security environment. This is particularly important to ensuring peace and stability in regions where the United States has vital or important interests and to broadening the community of free-market democracies. Strengthening and adapting alliances and coalitions that serve to protect shared interests and values are the most effective ways to accomplish these ends (QDR, 1997).

Through peacetime engagement activities, U.S. Armed Forces promote regional stability, increase the security of allies and friends, build coalitions, and ensure a more secure global environment. The International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) establish[es] long-term professional relationships between our Armed Forces and the future military leadership of other countries (National Military Strategy, 1998).

Similar to the State Department, the Defense Department has an explicit tangible stake in measuring the performance of DoD security assistance programs. Like the DoS, DoD is subject to GPRA. The requirement to measure the performance of security assistance programs like E-IMET presents DoD with a double-edged sword. A favorable measurement of effectiveness might guarantee future funding, but a negative report could jeopardize the program.

The Department of Defense also has an intangible stake in measuring E-IMET program effectiveness. As the international security environment develops DoD struggles to clearly identify its changing mission. With its growing role in non-traditional military functions, such as humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations, a key future DoD mission might be the delivery of international military-to-military and military-to-civilian training. One might conclude that DoD's future relevance partially rests on ensuring the continued support for military security assistance programs like E-IMET. A favorable E-IMET performance evaluation would go a long way towards assuring continued congressional support for DoD security assistance programs.

(4) **The Legislative Group.** In 1993 President Clinton signed into law the Government Performance and Results Act. Also in 1993, the President and Vice President initiated the National Performance Review (NPR) to reinvent government (NPR Benchmarking Report, 1997). As Hayward points out, however, “GPRA is more than an administration directive that can be rescinded or whose implementation can be stalled while waiting for a new administration with a different agenda” (Hayward, 1998, p. 2). In fact, Congress aspires to completely enhance government performance and results (Hayward, 1998). Representative Deborah Pryce of Ohio states very clearly the stake the Legislative Branch has in government performance evaluation:

As the custodians of our nation’s purse strings, Congress has an incredible responsibility. We have been entrusted to safeguard the hard-earned money that the taxpayers send to Washington. It is our responsibility to see to it that those dollars are spent wisely and that the American people get the biggest bang for this buck (freedom.house.gov/results Website, 1998).

Many other Congressional Senators and Representatives share similar feelings (see Arney, Burton, Horn, and Kingston, freedom.house.gov/results Website, 1998). In fact, the House Majority Leader has an Internet Website supporting and tracking the progress of the Results Act (<http://freedom.house.gov/results>). Improving the public confidence in the federal government by systematically holding federal agencies accountable for achieving program results has received broad support within the Legislative Branch.


Congressional support for GPRA represents an explicit intangible stake in E-IMET performance evaluation. Congress has clearly voiced their support for

legislation that holds agencies accountable for results. Failure to follow through on their promise would be a serious blow to the esteem and prestige of the people's elected officials. Regularly elected government officials have an incentive to see that the constituency they represent receives value for their tax dollars.

(5) **Summary.** Four different groups of stakeholders have a stake in E-IMET performance evaluation. The Executive Office of the President has a political stake in determining whether the E-IMET program meets the President's national security priorities. The Departments of State and Defense are each committed to the role of security assistance in the changing global security environment. Each department is also subject to the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act. Both departments have a stake in demonstrating the effectiveness E-IMET in order to ensure the program's continued existence. While the State Department tends to focus on the effectiveness of the broader IMET program, the Defense Department recognizes E-IMET as a separate program requiring its own set of performance indicators. The Legislature has a stake in the government-wide adherence to the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act. The people's elected representatives want to prove to their constituents that their money is not being wasted in Washington.

### **C. THE STAKEHOLDER MAP**

Based on their different stakes in the evaluation of the E-IMET program the various stakeholder groups can finally be organized into an overall stakeholder map. Figure 5 contains the E-IMET stakeholder map.



**Figure 5. The E-IMET Stakeholder Map**


## **D. CHAPTER SUMMARY**

The development and management of the E-IMET program involves the active participation and cooperation of several key stakeholders within the national government. The National Security Council of the President's Executive Office establishes the National Security Strategy that guides all other Executive Branch security assistance

efforts. By law, the Secretary of State is responsible for the supervision and general direction of all U.S. security assistance efforts. The Department of Defense is responsible for implementing military programs such as E-IMET. Through the DSCA, the DoD “has the largest supportive role from a level-of-effort standpoint” and is the most critical E-IMET stakeholder (DISAM, 1994, p. 95).

E-IMET stakeholders also exist in the Legislative Branch of the national government. Through its oversight role Congress authorizes and appropriates public funds necessary to keep the program alive. In an effort to ensure responsible spending Congress has demanded performance-based budgeting on the part of all government agencies.

Because it is assumed that individual stakeholders within the same higher-level governmental agency share common stakes in E-IMET performance evaluation, a grouping of stakeholders according to similar stakes is possible. Figure 5 represents the stakeholder map for the E-IMET program. Figure 6 summarizes the flow of communications for security assistance issues from the perspective of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA Presentation, 1998).



**Figure 6. Security Assistance Communications (DoD Perspective)**



## V. ANALYSIS: PART I

### A. INTRODUCTION

The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 states that “federal managers are seriously disadvantaged in their efforts to improve program efficiency and effectiveness, because of insufficient articulation of program goals and inadequate information on program performance” (GPRA, 1993, p. 2). GPRA emphasizes the setting of clear program goals and the measurement of program performance against those goals (GPRA, 1993). Developing a clear set of agreed-upon program goals (objectives) is often problematic, however. As Chapter IV clearly demonstrates, the E-IMET program has many internal and external stakeholders. It is possible that each stakeholder defines the program’s objectives differently. If a common definition of program objectives does not exist, than any attempt to objectively measure program performance will ultimately fail as multiple constituencies quarrel over whose set of objectives will serve as the performance baseline. Thus, it is necessary to analyze individual stakeholder objectives in order to determine if a single set of program objectives exist.

The purpose of this chapter is to identify each stakeholder’s security assistance objectives to determine if a single set of common objectives emerge. Using written documentation from each group of stakeholders, security assistance objectives were singled-out and compared to other stakeholder groups. Ultimately, a single set of national security assistance objectives emerged and was arranged into a “Global

Hierarchy.” Specific attributes were then identified for each of the common global sub-objectives and used to link the E-IMET program objectives back to the Global Hierarchy, creating an objective baseline for future performance measurement efforts.

## **B. THE GLOBAL HIERARCHY**

### **1. Methodology**

The bulk of this chapter will present the logic used to construct the Global Hierarchy. It will outline the steps in the process, highlight the key assumptions that were necessary, and examine the difficulties encountered during the process. The chapter will culminate with a Global Objectives Hierarchy for security assistance.

#### ***a. Step #1: Document Review***

In order to develop a Global Objectives Hierarchy for security assistance one must start with a detailed review of the key stakeholder documents that contain the stakeholder’s security assistance objectives. A basic assumption is that, since the role of the Executive Branch of the national government is to set policy, only Executive Branch stakeholder documents should be used to form the Global Hierarchy. The following Executive Branch stakeholder documents were analyzed:

#### **Executive Office of the President:**

1997 National Security Strategy  
1997 State of the Union Address

#### **Department of State:**

Fiscal Year 1999 Security Assistance Budget Request  
1998 Department of State Strategic Plan for International Affairs  
1998 Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations  
Fiscal Year 1999 Department of State Performance Plan

### **Defense Department:**

Fiscal Year 1999 Support for the Security Assistance Budget Request  
1997 Quadrennial Defense Review  
National Military Strategy  
Fiscal Year 1999 Department of Defense Performance Plan

The preceding list of documents is not exhaustive. It is, however, a fair representation of the key documents that guide Executive Branch stakeholder security assistance policy. In addition, as with the document selection process, all remaining steps used to construct the Global Hierarchy concentrates only on Executive Branch stakeholders.

#### ***b. Step #2: The Sifting Process***

Once the key stakeholder documents were chosen a sifting process separating security assistance objectives from other unrelated objectives followed for each stakeholder group. This process is largely subjective, although many of the documents clearly identified objectives as being security assistance related. Great care was taken to include all specific security assistance objectives as well as those that have only a marginal relation to the stakeholder's security assistance role. Ultimately, a separate objectives hierarchy was constructed for each stakeholder group using the sifting process and the selected documents.

The result was three stakeholder group hierarchies from which to form one Global Hierarchy. The purpose of first constructing three individual hierarchies was to allow for a comparison of security assistance objectives among the stakeholder groups. Objectives consensus is the foundation for the Global Hierarchy and the key prerequisite

for objective performance evaluation of the E-IMET program. By comparing the hierarchies to one another it is possible to determine the degree of consensus among the stakeholders' objectives.

(1) **Sifting Process Challenges.** Extracting specific security assistance objectives from the key stakeholder documents was a difficult and highly subjective process. Four specific difficulties were encountered during the sifting process.

(a) *Separating Objectives from Alternatives: **Ends** versus **Means**.* A common problem found in the key stakeholder documents was the mixing of objectives with specific strategies available to accomplish those objectives. Few federal documents systematically break down broad objectives into their relevant sub-objectives. Instead, many of the stakeholder documents highlighted a broad objective (“ends”) and proceeded directly into a discussion of the alternatives available to achieve the final result desired (“means”). An example can be found in the Defense Department’s FY99 Performance Plan. Promote Stability, which is an ends or objective, is immediately followed by Overseas Presence, which is a means or method for accomplishing the objective (DoD Performance Plan, 1998). This confusion inevitably results in a lack of measurable detail concerning the overall objective that is required if one is to determine whether the program achieved its objectives. In other words, while government agencies are busy identifying methods to achieve an objective, they fail to sufficiently expand enough on their objectives to make measurement possible.

(b) *Separating Security Assistance Objectives from **Unrelated Objectives**.* Extracting from the key stakeholder documents the objectives and

sub-objectives that relate only to security assistance was the most difficult part of constructing the Global Hierarchy. Each document contained references to stakeholder objectives that are not specifically related to their security assistance mission. An example can be found in the Department of State's FY99 Performance Plan. The State Department lists Stabilize World Population Growth as a global objective. Clearly this objective is not related to the definition of security assistance from Chapter I, and should not be included in a global security assistance hierarchy.

Again, this is a highly subjective process as many governmental objectives are interdependent. It is essential, however, to separate specific security assistance goals from unrelated goals in order to construct a single hierarchy.

(c) *Practice in Constructing a Global Hierarchy.* As Saaty points out, in practice there is no set procedure for generating the objectives and sub-objectives included in a hierarchy (Saaty, 1980). In fact, constructing a global security assistance hierarchy proved to be an original exercise. No individual interviewed from any of the Executive or Legislative Branch stakeholder agencies knew of any previous effort to link national security assistance objectives using a Global Hierarchy. The lack of practice in creating a Global Objectives Hierarchy resulted in a significant challenge to the overall process.

(d) *Time Commitment.* One explanation for the lack of practice in constructing a Global Hierarchy is the amount of time it takes to analyze the key documents for each E-IMET stakeholder. Since responsibility for various parts of the E-IMET program is shared among three primary agencies within the Executive

Branch, the process of constructing individual hierarchies and synthesizing them into one Global Hierarchy was very time consuming.

*c. Step #3: Constructing the Global Hierarchy*

The next step is to actually construct the Global Hierarchy. The existence of objective consensus among the individual stakeholders is vital to the construction of an objectives hierarchy. Fortunately, once ends were separated from their means, there emerged a consensus of basic security assistance sub-objectives among Executive Branch stakeholders.

Each stakeholder defined their individual objectives in relation to The President's three core national security objectives of **enhanced security**, **economic prosperity**, and a **democratic world** (National Security Strategy and State of the Union Address, 1997) (See Figure 7). Further, agreement existed among the remaining stakeholders concerning their definition of the sub-objectives of the President's core goals. These common sub-objectives include **international stability**, **uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies, and strategic resources**, and **support for democratic principles** (See Figure 7).

The next step in the construction process was to further break down each broad sub-objective into the specific attributes that characterize that sub-objective. Here the stakeholders defined the specific attributes from their point of view. For instance, the State Department recognized that uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies, and strategic resources require the growth of transitional and developing economies from socialist to market-based economies. The Defense Department, however, recognized that



the same sub-objective requires access to foreign military bases. Are one right and the other wrong? Within the context of the Global Hierarchy, the mission of national security assistance should include both stakeholder attributes. Building the Global Hierarchy, therefore, is a process of incorporating each stakeholder's relevant attributes into the larger picture. This is exactly as GPRA 1993 dictates—the inclusion of internal and external stakeholders into the objectives-setting process. The Global Hierarchy, therefore, starts with a common set of broad sub-objectives and incorporates each stakeholder's relevant attributes.

The final Global Objectives Hierarchy can be found in Figure 7.

*d. Step #4: Validation*

Ultimately, the resulting Global Hierarchy, and the criteria used to select the sub-objectives and specific attributes, was validated through an interview process with various Executive Branch stakeholders. The validation process consisted of interviews with officials from the Departments of State and Defense.<sup>9</sup> Officials were chosen from the organizations within each stakeholder group that deal most often with E-IMET issues. They are assumed to represent the views of the entire stakeholder group. Interviews were conducted with officials from the following organizations:

**Department of State:**

The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

---

<sup>9</sup> Officials from the Executive Office of the President were unavailable for interviews. The National Security Strategy and the President's State of the Union Address, which define the ultimate objectives placed on top of the Global Hierarchy, clearly convey the views of that key stakeholder.







Figure 7

# **Security Assistance Objectives** *The Global Hierarchy*





**Department of Defense:**

Asst. Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)  
Defense Security Cooperation Agency

(1) **Validating the Objectives Selection Criteria.** Two simple criteria were used to select the individual stakeholder objectives and specific attributes that would be incorporated into the Global Hierarchy.

The first criterion was that the stated objective had to fit the definition of an “end.” In other words, to qualify as an objective it could not be interpreted as “means,” or an alternative. It must be a clear statement of the final result desired, not a method to get there.

The second criterion was that the objective had to relate to security assistance, either directly or indirectly. This criterion is purposefully subjective and broad in recognition of the fact that security assistance takes many forms and is related to many objectives.

Each stakeholder interviewed validated the criteria used to select objectives for the Global Hierarchy.

(2) **Validating the Global Hierarchy.** Each stakeholder group interviewed also validated the final Global Hierarchy. No disagreement existed among the stakeholders as to the relationship between the highest level objectives defined by the President, the common sub-objectives, and the specific attributes that characterize the sub-objectives.



It should be stressed that, while the Global Hierarchy was validated through numerous stakeholder interviews, national security assistance objectives will likely change over time. As such, the Global Hierarchy will require periodic revalidation as international security conditions evolve. Revalidation efforts should also include new stakeholders whenever possible.

## 2. Linking the E-IMET Objectives to the Global Hierarchy

Once the Global Hierarchy was constructed and specific attributes were identified the next logical step was to link the specific E-IMET program objectives back to the hierarchy. If an E-IMET objective could be logically linked to the achievement of a specific attribute within the Global Hierarchy a solid triangle, circle, or box was placed under the attribute. This linkage is made possible by the development of individual hierarchies for each E-IMET objective. For example, **improved military justice systems in accordance with international human rights** can be linked to the **existence of neutral law enforcement** within a country since neutral law enforcement bodies are central to Western-style military justice systems (See Figure 7).

Because performance measurement systems do not yet exist within the security assistance community, any attempt to link E-IMET objectives back to the Global Objectives Hierarchy is largely subjective. Quantitative data have yet to be collected that objectively conclude that E-IMET programs have resulted in the achievement of higher global objectives. The development of individual hierarchies for each E-IMET objective, however, provides a formal logic for the linkage. Additionally, anecdotal evidence, in the form of congressional testimony from various State and Defense Department officials, as

well as stakeholder validation, is available, however.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, interviews with the Executive Branch stakeholders validated the logical link between the Global Hierarchy and specific E-IMET objectives.

The validated Global Hierarchy and its connection to the specific E-IMET objectives can be found in Figure 7.

## **C. CHAPTER SUMMARY**

Figure 7 contains the Global Objectives Hierarchy for security assistance. To construct the hierarchy a sifting process was applied to key Executive Branch stakeholder documents in an effort to identify their individual security assistance sub-objectives and specific attributes. While the President defines the ultimate security assistance objective, a common set of sub-objectives was identified for each stakeholder group. To complete the hierarchy each stakeholder's specific attributes for the common sub-objectives were added. Thus, in the spirit of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, a Global Hierarchy emerged that incorporates each stakeholder group into the objectives-setting process.

Figure 7 also shows the logical link between specific E-IMET objectives and the national security assistance objectives. While no quantitative performance data exists to objectively link specific E-IMET objectives back to the Global Hierarchy, anecdotal evidence is available. Now that specific E-IMET objectives have been logically linked to

---

<sup>10</sup> Anecdotal evidence concludes that IMET and E-IMET programs are an integral part of the national security assistance effort. Examples include congressional testimony from military officers, including various regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), and various DoD and DoS officials (see Larson 1993, McCaffrey 1995, Wilhelm 1998, Slocombe 1998, Shattuck 1996, and Hamilton, 1997).

national security assistance objectives the challenge is to develop performance indices that objectively measure the effectiveness of the E-IMET intervention.



## **VI. ANALYSIS: PART II**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The third step in the public sector performance evaluation process is the development of performance indices for each program objective. The objectives of the E-IMET program are:

1. Respect for Civilian Control Over the Military;
2. Improve Military Justice Systems and Procedures In Accordance With International Human Rights;
3. Improve Defense Resources Management.

In order to evaluate whether various E-IMET interventions are having the desired effect one must measure results against the original objectives. This chapter will identify specific performance indicators that can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the E-IMET program and highlight the key difficulties encountered in the process.

The indices proposed in this chapter stem from the data collected through secondary archival research and specialized interviews. It is important to note that the indices developed here are general in nature and have not been patterned to a specific country or region. This chapter is not meant to be an exhaustive list of E-IMET performance indices, but rather a starting point for future development.

### **B. THE IMPORTANCE OF A BASELINE ASSESSMENT**

The performance evaluation process is essentially a comparison of post-intervention results against objective data gathered during a baseline assessment. A

baseline assessment is defined as the “initial collection of data to establish a basis for comparison” (National Performance Review, 1997, p. 27). The success of the E-IMET performance evaluation process hinges on the objective initial assessment of a nation’s civilian leadership, military justice system, and ability to efficiently manage defense resources. If one does not possess a clear picture of civil-military relations, military justice, and resources management within a country before the initial intervention, attributing future incremental changes to the E-IMET program is not possible. All program results must therefore be stated in terms of a progression away from the baseline assessment.

The performance indices proposed in this chapter assume that an objective baseline assessment is conducted by U.S. Embassy staff (i.e.: The Security Assistance Officer (SAO)) or other DoD officials *before* a country is selected to receive E-IMET training. Currently, “needs assessments” are routinely conducted as part of the first phase of many E-IMET programs. It is unclear, however, whether current needs assessments are intended to form the objective baseline necessary for incremental performance evaluation or simply an effort to match specific E-IMET programs to perceived needs within a country. The design and implementation of an E-IMET performance evaluation baseline assessment is beyond the scope of this study, but its importance within the performance evaluation process should not be overlooked.

## **C. INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE FOR THE E-IMET PROGRAM**

### **1. Civilian Control Over the Military**

The first E-IMET objective is the promotion of understanding and respect for civilian control over the military. In order to propose performance indicators for this

objective one must define the specifics of civilian control over the military. Unfortunately, many scholars debate the characteristics of civilian control over the military in terms of modern civil-military relations.<sup>11</sup>

*a. Civilian Control versus Good Civil-Military Relations*

The congressional legislation authorizing the expansion of IMET training to include civilian control over the military concentrates only on the act of civilian control, not on the dynamics of good civil-military relations (U.S. Congress, 1991). The difference is subtle, but enormously important in terms of performance evaluation. Evaluating the quality of a country's civil-military relations is largely subjective, but evaluating the degree of civilian control over the military is fairly clear cut. While scholars disagree on what conditions are best for good civil-military relations, there is rough agreement on what constitutes civilian control. During the Cold War both the United States and the Soviet Union enjoyed civilian dominance over their expansive militaries, but scholars often characterize U.S. and Soviet civil-military relations quite differently (see Michael C. Desch's "Threat Environments and Military Missions," in Diamond and Plattner's Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, 1996). E-IMET performance indices, therefore, must concentrate only on the changes within a country that results in greater civilian control over the military establishment. Whether gains toward civilian control result in better overall civil-military relations and a more peaceful or democratic society is another question entirely.

---

<sup>11</sup> The writings of Huntington 1996, Desch 1996 and 1998, Avant 1998, Bracken 1995, and Segal 1995 offer lively debates concerning civilian control over the military and modern civil-military relations.

*b. Civilian Control Objectives Hierarchy and Performance Indices*

In order to develop performance indices for civilian control over the military, one must first break down the broad objective of civilian control into multiple sub-objectives and specific attributes. The goal of this process is to construct a civilian control over the military objectives hierarchy that can be used to identify subsequent performance indicators. Drawing heavily from the U.S. model of civilian military control, and following the same format as the Global Security Assistance Hierarchy found in Chapter V, the objective of civilian control over the military can be broken down into the following sub-objectives:

Sub-Objective #1:

**Military's Organizational Structure and Culture Emphasize Civilian Dominance**

Sub-Objective #2:

**The Military is used to Counter External Threats vice Internal Problems**

Sub-Objective #3:

**Presentation of the Military is Through an Objective Source<sup>12</sup>**

Specific attributes that characterize each sub-objective must then be identified in order to complete the hierarchy. Based on the specific attribute, it is possible to propose indicators of performance that can be used to report whether the E-IMET intervention is achieving its stated objective. The specific attributes of each sub-objective, along with their respective indicators of performance, follow.

---

<sup>12</sup> This sub-objective refers to the right of the citizenry to receive information concerning the activities and policies of their military without state-sponsored censure.

*Sub-Objective #1:*

Military's Organizational Structure and Culture Emphasize Civilian Dominance

*Specific Attributes:*

1. The Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces is a civilian and shares power with a popularly elected legislature.

*Indicators of Performance:*

- The Commander-in-Chief commissions officers after first nominating them to the people's popularly elected representatives.
  - The Commander-in-Chief promotes officers after first nominating them to the people's popularly elected representatives.
  - The Commander-in-Chief is a civilian.
2. Norms exist within the military for subordination to civilian control.

*Note:* This attribute can be further divided into the following two attributes:

- a. The military is politically neutral.

*Indicators of Performance:*

- The military accepts all missions laid out by the civilian authorities.
- The military does not try to influence policy-making (specific limitations and constraints are placed on the military's ability to influence policy debates).
- Civilians decide on ends of policy while the military decides on the means, and civilian authorities define the line between ends and means.
- The military is professionally vice ideologically driven.
- The military does not impose its values upon civilian institutions and organizations.

- Special military bodies exercising political power are eliminated.
- b. A dialogue exists between civilian and military experts.

*Indicators of Performance:*

- Open debate exists within military and civilian communities.
  - Civilian and military staffs work together to solve long term problems and issues.
  - The number of major conflicts between civilian and military leaders decreases.
  - The public has access to military leaders through their elected representatives.
3. The civilian leadership maintains total legal control over the military.

*Note:* This attribute can be further divided into the following two attributes:

- a. The military's budget is controlled by the popularly elected legislature.

*Indicators of Performance:*

- The legislature approves the military's budget and subsequent expenditures ("The Power of the Purse").
- The legislature approves the final composition of all military bases and depots.
- The overall size of the military is controlled by the civilian legislature.
- The legislature approves the composition of forces.

- b. The civilian-military chain of command is legally based.

*Indicator of Performance:*

- A formal civilian-controlled chain of command exists and is based in law.

4. Civil-military organizational relationships emphasize civilian control.

*Note:* This attribute can be further divided into the following two attributes:

- a. The civilianization of high political offices.

*Indicator of Performance:*

- Movement of civilians into traditional military positions within the Defense Ministry.
- b. No excessive influence by the military of the military-industrial complex.

*Indicators of Performance:*

- The legislature controls the military's relationship with industry.
- Military-run business and industries are privatized.

*Sub-Objective #2:*

The Military is used to Counter External Threats vice Internal Problems

*Specific Attributes:*

1. Externally oriented military mission and doctrine.

*Indicators of Performance:*

- Military doctrines are implemented with an external focus.



- The curricula of service academies are revised stressing civilian control and external missions for the military.
  - Laws regulating the use of the military for internal purposes are implemented.
  - The military redeploys forces away from internal missions.
  - The military defends society against external threats.
2. Internal problems are addressed without the use of the military.

*Indicator of Performance:*

- Internal problems, formerly addressed through military means, are now addressed with non-military state agencies.

*Sub-Objective #3:*

Presentation of the Military is Through an Objective Source

***Specific Attributes:***

1. A free domestic media.

*Indicators of Performance:*

- Open dialogue exists between the press and the military.
  - Governmental control (censorship) of press reporting is discontinued.
2. Free public access to published government information.

*Indicators of Performance:*

- The public has free access to military budget data and deployment statistics.
- The public has free access to the voting records of elected officials.

The complete hierarchy of the sub-objectives and specific attributes for the civilian control objective can be found in Figure 8.




Figure 8. Civilian Control Over the Military Objectives Hierarchy

*c. Limitations*

While the researcher believes that objectively measuring the progress toward civilian control over the military is possible, limitations do exist. First, many of the performance indicators measure only structural changes in the military organization. Cultural and behavioral changes are often more important and much more difficult to measure. This limitation should not overshadow, however, the importance of detecting structural changes, as they are necessary in order to bring about the changes in behavior that characterize the culture of civilian control.

A second limitation involves the long-term nature of organizational change. Segal warns that that civilian control and good civil-military relations is a process, not an existential state (Segal, 1995). Attempts to measure civilian control over the military should not be single snapshots in time but rather a series of snapshots over the duration of the program. Each measure must be continually compared to the baseline assessment in order to determine if the E-IMET intervention had the intended effect.

Another important limitation is the inability to control external variables when measuring the effectiveness of the E-IMET intervention. Huntington points out that one reason why so many military regimes in Latin America have voluntarily surrendered power is due not to the efforts of the U.S., but rather to the recognition on the part of military leaders “that there are no easy solutions to the intractable economic, social, and political problems confronting their respective countries, and that the sustained involvement in politics has disastrous effects on the coherence, efficiency, and discipline of the army” (Huntington, 1995, p. 7). Military leaders selfishly chose to avoid

politics in an effort to regain control over their armies and leave the tough decisions to others. In this case, survival, rather than a dedication to the ideal of civilian control, motivates the military's surrender of power. Situations such as this make it difficult to separate the effects of the E-IMET intervention from the external environment.

Contentious indicators of civilian control over the military also exist that make performance evaluation more complicated. Scholars disagree, for example, whether military representativeness of society is an indicator of civilian control. Huntington believes that a professional and politically neutral military is an indicator of civilian control and proper civil-military relations, regardless of its societal representation (Huntington, 1995). Janowitz, on the other hand, believes that proper civilian control starts with the "citizen-soldier" and a military that mirrors the society it defends (Segal, 1995). For this reason, the researcher chose not to include military representativeness of society as an indicator of performance. Other contentious indicators, such as the abolition of conscription, were also intentionally left out because it is unclear that they indicate greater civilian control over the military.

## **2. Improved Military Justice Systems**

The 1991 law that expanded IMET training specifically called for new courses focused on "creating and implementing effective military justice systems and codes of conduct with a special emphasis on the protection of human rights" (U.S. Congress, 1991, p. 135). The new law called for a dedicated training effort aimed at improving the military justice systems of current and potential U.S. allies in accordance with international human rights standards. As with civilian control over the military, assessing

the progress toward this objective is a matter of measuring post-training gains toward more humane military justice systems.

*a. Improved Military Justice Systems Objectives Hierarchy and Performance Indices*

In order to propose performance indicators for this objective one must define the essential characteristics and objectives of a humane system of military justice. The U.S. system of military justice will serve as the model for this study. Using the objectives hierarchy approach the broad objective of improved military justice systems will be broken down into multiple sub-objectives and specific attributes patterned after the U.S. model of military justice. The goal of this process is to construct an improved military justice systems objectives hierarchy that can be used to identify subsequent performance indicators. The improved military justice systems objective can be broken down into the following broad sub-objectives:

Sub-Objective #1:

**Eliminate the Potential for War Crimes**

Sub-Objective #2:

**Eliminate Peacetime Human Rights Abuses by the Military**

The second sub-objective can be further broken down into the following two additional objectives:

Additional Objective A:

**Establish a Western Style Military Justice System That Recognizes the Rights of the Individual**

## Additional Objective B:

### **Civilian Control Over the Military**

In this case sub-objective #1 shares common attributes with both the additional objectives identified for sub-objective #2.<sup>13</sup> The following common specific attributes, along with their respective indicators of performance, have been identified for the additional objectives of sub-objective #2:

#### *Additional Objective A:*

Establish a Western Style Military Justice System That Recognizes the Rights of the Individual

#### *Specific Attributes:*

1. Established legal system based on the assumption of innocence, the law of evidence, and the burden of proof.

#### *Indicators of Performance:*

- A new or revised military justice code is adopted that contains written rules akin to the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) which define offenses, authority and jurisdiction requirements, and outline procedures for the legal system.
- The system allows for representation of the accused.
- Conscientious objection is decriminalized.
- The legal system controls the release of personal information.
- A professional corps of legal officers is established within the military (i.e.: A JAG corps).

---

<sup>13</sup> This is done since many countries possessing the various attributes that characterize sub-objective #2 often achieve sub-objective #1 simultaneously. One could argue that greater civilian control over the military, coupled with a U.S. style military justice system, is an effective way to eliminate the potential for war crimes.

- Military persons are afforded the same protections that civilians have in the country's civilian judicial system.
  - Appeals are allowed.
  - Court officers are both military officers and officials of the court.
2. The prosecutor, defense council, investigator, and judge have legally established roles.

Note: This attribute can be further divided into the following three attributes:

- a. Effective Advocacy.

Indicators of Performance:

- The accused is allowed to consult with a defense lawyer prior to the trial.
- Military and civilian legal sectors work together to ensure the rights of the accused are not violated.
- Trial advocacy clinics are established for military lawyers.

- b. Fair, Impartial, and Authoritative Judgements.

Indicators of Performance:

- Judgements of the court are carried out.
- Human rights executive training seminars are established for military judges.
- Members of the military are openly willing to have their cases heard before a military court.

- c. Official criminal investigative procedures recognize the rights of the accused and accepted standards for the search and seizure of evidence.



Indicators of Performance:

- The investigative process is revised recognizing the rights of the individual.
  - Interrogation and the potential for self-incrimination are constrained by law.
  - The search and seizure of evidence is strictly regulated.
3. The sentencing process is fair and impartial.

Indicators of Performance:

- Detention practices are revised recognizing the right of due process and the assumption of innocence.
  - Alternatives for punishment exist aside from prison. These include administrative punishment, nonjudicial punishment, and reduction in pay and grade.
4. Humane military prison system.

Indicators of Performance:

- No torture is allowed.
  - Rules exist that enforce the humane treatment of prisoners.
  - Outside agencies, such the International Red Cross, are allowed to inspect prison facilities.
5. Corruption and the abuse of power are prevented and ethical behavior is promoted.

Indicators of Performance:

- No undue command influence is exercised by the military.
- Tampering with the judicial process is made illegal.

- Rules of engagement (ROE) are developed during military operations that respect the sanctity of human life and the role of non-combatants.

*Additional Sub-Objective #1:*

Civilian Control Over the Military

*Specific Attributes:*

1. Elected officials control the military judicial system.

*Indicators of Performance:*

- The military justice system originated with the civilian authority that controls the military.
- Members of the military have the right to bring unresolved problems to the attention of their elected representatives.

*Note:* The remaining attributes for this additional sub-objective are the same as those described in the second section of this chapter.

The complete hierarchy of sub-objectives and specific attributes for the improved military justice systems objective can be found in Figure 9.

***b. Limitations***

There are limitations to the use of the researcher's performance indices. The chief limitation is the selection of the U.S. military justice system as the model of choice. While few argue that the U.S. system of justice is widely regarded for its respect for human rights, the assumption that all countries can or must adhere to the same judicial procedures may be problematic. Customs and traditions may limit the strict application of the U.S. judicial model in some countries. Application of all the performance indicators identified in this study may not be possible in some countries.




Figure 9. Improved Military Justice Systems Objectives Hierarchy

Additionally, the proposed performance indicators for improved military justice systems only measure structural and process changes, not behavioral ones. Measuring changes in behavior involves highly subjective processes and is not possible with the researcher's proposed indicators. A change to the military's justice system is, however, the first step toward changing the judicial culture of the military.

### **3. Defense Resources Management**

The third E-IMET objective is the improvement of defense resources management. The need for better management of military resources was recognized long before Congress expanded the IMET program to include respect for civilian control over the military and human rights. The Defense Resources Management Institute (DRMI), for example, was established at the Naval Postgraduate School in 1965 to help the United States and its allies with resources management education (DRMI Website, 1998). It is important to note that programs such as those offered by DRMI do not teach job-specific skills. Instead, they focus on building management skills that participants can apply throughout their careers. In order to propose performance indicators for this objective, however, one must clearly define the specific attributes of defense resources management.

#### ***a. Defining Defense Resources Management***

While defining civilian control and humane military justice is fairly straightforward, specifying the attributes of improved resource management is much more difficult. To date, neither the State Department nor DSCA has clearly defined the E-IMET objective of "improved defense resources management." While the management

literature does attempt to define the domain of resources management (see Hitch and McKean 1967, Sandler and Hartley 1995) DSCA and the Department of State have not specified the final result desired (also known as “endstate”) for their training and education efforts (Bonsper Interview, 1998).<sup>14</sup> In other words, while the endstates of the first two E-IMET objectives is clear (namely civilian dominance over the military and the adoption of a Western-style military justice system) the final result desired for the improved defense resources management objective is ambiguous. Without a clearly defined endstate one cannot identify the specific attributes of defense resources management.

In order to develop the objectives hierarchy and performance indices for the third E-IMET objective the researcher proposes the following endstate for improved defense resources management training and education:

**The adoption of a decision-making process for allocating scarce defense resources that is transparent, interactive, and objectives-oriented.**

The researcher defines a “transparent” decision-making process as one where critical decision-making steps are visibly linked, iterative, and follow a specific schedule, have a defined product, are completed by a specified stakeholder or group of stakeholders (and the completing entity is known to all the remaining stakeholders), and employ a well-defined and widely understood methodology. The opposite of a transparent process is a

---

<sup>14</sup> The *final result desired* (or “endstate”) describes the desired result of the action (United States Marine Corps *Warfighting*, 1989). A clear explanation and understanding of the desired final result of defense resources management training and education is absolutely essential to the development of specific attributes and subsequent performance indices.

“black box” where defense programs are the outcome of some unknown military planning process (Bonsper, 1998). A decision-making process is “interactive” if both military and civilian stakeholders play an active role during each step in the process. Finally, it is “objectives-oriented” if it evaluates existing programs and develops new ones based on continuously revised strategic objectives.

Using the researcher’s proposed endstate, the sub-objectives and specific attributes for the E-IMET objective can now be identified and arranged into an objectives hierarchy.

*b. Measuring the Performance of Defense Resource Management Programs*

The E-IMET objective of improved defense resource management can be broken down into the following three sub-objectives:

Sub-Objective #1:

**Transparent Resource Management Process**

Sub-Objective #2:

**Interactive Resource Management Process**

Sub-Objective #3:

**Objectives-oriented Resource Management Process**

The following specific attributes, along with their respective indicators of performance, have been identified for the sub-objectives of improved defense resources management:

*Sub-Objective #1:*

Transparent Resource Management Process

*Specific Attributes:*

1. Decision-making steps are visibly linked, iterative, and follow a specific schedule.

*Indicators of Performance*

- A comprehensive threat assessment is performed and precedes defense resource allocation decisions.
  - A national military strategy is developed to counter the anticipated threat and precedes the development of specific programs.
  - Defense programs are developed to carry out the national military strategy.
  - Defense program requirements are translated into annual budget requests.
  - Threat assessments, strategic planning, and program development occur periodically according to a published master schedule.
2. Each decision-making step results in a defined product.

*Indicators of Performance*

- Threat assessments result in official strategic planning guidance issued to the military.
- A national military strategy is published that defines strategic objectives and priorities.
- Defense programs consist of detailed manpower (civilian and military) and material (equipment) requirements.
- An annual budget is produced.



3. Decision-making steps are completed by a specified stakeholder or group of stakeholders.

*Indicators of Performance*

- Civilian and military intelligence communities cooperate to produce threat assessments.
  - Individual service chiefs provide input to the national military strategy.
  - Defense programs are developed independently by each service, but are reviewed by a central authority.
  - Military comptrollers translate program requirements into annual budget requests.
  - The people's elected representatives approve disbursements from the national treasury for defense programs.
  - Civilian authorities approve the transfer of resources among programs.
4. Each step in the decision-making process employs a well-defined and widely understood methodology.

*Indicators of Performance*

- Threat assessments update past threats, reassess current threats, and explore future threats.
- The national military strategy defines the military's plan for countering current and future threats and is not fiscally constrained.
- Defense program choices are compared to each other on the basis of cost and effectiveness (capability) and ranked in order of importance (priority).
- The planning process is capable of determining the relative importance of defense programs.
- Criteria exist to evaluate, rank, and prioritize programs.

- Civilian and military leaders use cost estimations and capability assessments to compare individual programs before selecting a preferred alternative.
- Budget requests are compared to resource availability.
- Priority programs are funded first when military program requests exceed resource availability (and funding cuts start with the lowest priority programs).

*Sub-Objective #2:*

Interactive Resource Management Process

*Specific Attribute:*

1. Military and civilian leaders share in the responsibilities of the resource management process.

*Indicators of Performance*

- Military officials assess the threat, develop the national military strategy, estimate the requirements of that strategy, and develop programs to package and execute the strategy.
- The people's elected representatives approve the programs along with their respective cost ceilings.
- Inter-agency committees composed of military and civilian officials exist to coordinate planning and budgeting (i.e.: a "corporate" planning board oversees the entire resource management process).

*Sub-Objective #3:*

Objectives-oriented Resource Management Process

*Specific Attributes:*

1. Individual defense programs can be linked to specific strategic objectives.

### Indicators of Performance

- The military develops a strategic plan.
  - Defense programs are linked to objectives within the military's strategic plan.
  - The military justifies its major programs to the people's elected representatives on the basis of strategic objectives.
2. The resource management process balances short-term objectives with long-term objectives.

### Indicators of Performance

- Civilian officials allocate resources to maintain ongoing operations as well as to finance investments in procurement, new weapons research, and military construction.
  - Long-term investment programs (procurement, construction, RDT&E) are fully funded while ongoing operations are incrementally funded.<sup>15</sup>
  - The development of future programs and the formulation of the next budget occur simultaneously ("parallel processes") within the resource management process.
  - Civilian and military officials consider long-term trends in threat conditions before making immediate program changes.
  - The level of military program funding rises and falls with the threat environment.
3. Defense programs are reevaluated when strategic objectives are revised.

---

<sup>15</sup> "Fully funded" means that the civilian appropriators have provided all the resources necessary to complete the approved long-term project and are committed to seeing the project through to its completion. It does not mean that the military receives all the resources at once, however. "Incremental funding" is the annual appropriation of only one year's worth of resources.

### Indicator of Performance

- Periodic cost-effectiveness evaluations of existing defense programs based on revised strategic objectives.

The complete hierarchy of sub-objectives and specific attributes for the improved defense resources management objective can be found in Figure 10.

#### *c. Limitations*

Like the first two E-IMET objectives, there are limitations to the use of the researcher's performance indices. One possible limitation is the use of a generic Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) model as the template for this analysis. The PPBS template provides a past definition of defense resource management. Even the United States, considered a leader in defense resource management initiatives, has used more recent processes to manage its defense resources, including Management by Objectives (1973) and Zero-Base Budgeting (1977) (GAO, 1997). Although the PPB system has its detractors and flaws (see Roberts 1993), it is useful to demonstrate *how* objectives can be derived even if one were to substitute another process for PPBS in the future. Therefore, even though the use of a generic PPBS model may be a limitation, the researcher believes it is an excellent starting point for evaluating defense resources management.

A more important limitation involves the actual measurement of progressions or improvements away from the defense resources management baseline assessment. In order to observe the indicators of performance security assistance officials




Figure 10. Improved Defense Resources Management Objectives Hierarchy

would have to gain access to the highest levels of all ministries where defense resource allocation decisions are made. In the absence of such direct high-level access, actual improvements in defense resources management could be inferred from informal discussions with government officials at all levels, public statements regarding defense matters, and general coverage in the media of the country.

#### **D. THE BALANCED SCORECARD**

Assuming a country receives training in all three E-IMET areas, collecting data on every indicator will likely be time consuming, expensive, and overwhelming for the security assistance manager. In-country security assistance officials must choose a handful of indicators to apply to their unique situation. In order to present the various indicators of performance for each E-IMET objective in a user-friendly manner the researcher proposes the “balanced scorecard” format developed by Kaplan and Norton.

##### **1. The Kaplan/Norton Balanced Scorecard**

The Balanced Scorecard is simply “a set of measures that gives top managers a fast but comprehensive view of the business” (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, p. 1). Kaplan and Norton developed the Balanced Scorecard after realizing that senior private sector executives do not rely on only one set of performance measures to the exclusion of another (Kaplan and Norton, 1992).

No single measure can provide a clear performance target or focus attention on the critical areas of the business. Managers want a balanced presentation of both financial and operational measures (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, p. 71).

Think of the Balanced Scorecard as the dials and indicators in an airplane cockpit. For the complex task of navigating and flying an airplane, pilots need detailed information about many aspects of the flight. [They need] indicators that summarize the current and predicted environment. (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, p. 72).

Private sector managers realize that they cannot absorb the information generated by every conceivable measure of performance. “The Balanced Scorecard brings together, in a single management report, many of the seemingly disparate elements of a company’s competitive agenda” (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, p. 73). The Scorecard forces managers to choose among various performance measures with different business perspectives (objectives), focusing on the handful of measures that are most critical (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). By selecting three to four key measures within each business objective managers can link a wide range of performance measurement data allowing them to make better decisions in a time critical environment. The format of the Kaplan/Norton Balanced Scorecard, as well as their private sector example of an electronics company, can be found in Figure 11.

## **2. The E-IMET Balanced Scorecard**


While Kaplan and Norton use the Balanced Scorecard to present financial and operational data for private sector firms, the same method of presentation is useful for managers of public sector programs with multiple objectives. The Kaplan/Norton Balanced Scorecard format can be modified so that chosen performance indicators are listed alongside their respective sub-objective each of the E-IMET objectives. These modified scorecards can serve as comprehensive security assistance management tools



*Format:*

Perspective	
GOALS	<i>Measures</i>

*Electronics Company Example:*



**Figure 11. Kaplan/Norton Balanced Scorecard Format and Example**

for tracking the achievement of each E-IMET objective within a given country. The Kaplan/Norton private sector Balanced Scorecard thus becomes the “(Country’s Name) Balanced Scorecard” for the E-IMET program.

The researcher recommends that the selection of performance indicators for a specific country be done by State or Defense Department professionals with significant in-country experience (i.e.: A Security Assistance Officer (SAO) or other embassy official). Deciding what indicators of performance are most meaningful for their country is a subjective process. For example, to aid in the selection of the handful of civilian control indicators used within a specific country Paul Stockton of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Civil-Military Relations recommends grouping the various attributes and performance indicators into two major categories; those that are essential to civilian control and those that are indicators of the quality or depth of civilian control.<sup>16</sup> Since no in-country security assistance officials participated in this study, an accurate grouping according to Dr. Stockton’s recommendation is outside the scope of this study. Such a categorization would, however, help regional security assistance officers decide what performance indicators to include in their country’s balanced scorecard.

A complete “(Country’s Name) Balanced Scorecard” example can be found in Figure 12.

---

<sup>16</sup> Dr. Stockton identifies a third category as well; contentious indicators of civilian control. This category includes controversial indicators that are often debated among civil-military relations scholars. The researcher discussed this category in the indicators of civilian control over the military limitations section.




Figure 12. “(Country’s Name) Balanced Scorecard” Example

## E. CHAPTER SUMMARY

Objectively measuring the results of the E-IMET effort involves tracking the changes within a country toward greater civilian control over the military, more humane

military justice systems, and improved defense resources management. In order for officials to determine whether the E-IMET intervention is responsible for significant organizational and national changes a baseline assessment must first be compiled. Due to the multi-faceted nature of resource management, the State Department and DSCA must also clearly define a desired endstate for “improved defense resources management.” Various indicators of performance can then be combined with survey data so security assistance officers can compare post-training changes with the baseline assessment to get a clearer picture of the effectiveness of E-IMET training. While limitations do exist, the performance indicators proposed in this chapter offer an alternative to traditional anecdotal evidence.

## VII. CONCLUSION

### A. INTRODUCTION

In 1991, the U.S. Congress expanded the scope of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program to include a focus on (Cope, 1995):

- Greater respect for and grasp of democracy and civilian rule of law, including the principle of civilian control over the military;
- Military justice systems in a democracy, including a better understanding of internationally recognized human rights;
- Responsible defense resource management.

In doing so, they aligned the IMET program with the new Post Cold War security environment. The Departments of State and Defense, however, did not agree on a system to evaluate the effectiveness of the expanded IMET (E-IMET) program. In 1993, the U.S. Congress enacted the Government Performance and Results Act requiring all government agencies to establish top-level goals and objectives, define how they intend to achieve those goals, and demonstrate how they will measure agency and program performance in achieving those goals (GPRA, 1993).

The purpose for this study is to address how the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the Department of Defense (DoD) can tackle the challenge of measuring the effectiveness and performance of the E-IMET program. This chapter will summarize the study's findings based on the original research questions.

## **B. RESTATEMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

### **Primary Research Question:**

What could a performance evaluation system developed for the E-IMET program look like?

### **Subsidiary Research Questions:**

1. What are the challenges to performance evaluation of public programs?
2. What factors unique to the political environment necessarily limit the application of rational-analytic assessment models when measuring costs and benefits of current security assistance programs?
3. Can a system be developed that balances the reality of the political bureaucratic process with the rationality of economic cost-benefit analysis?
4. What are the implications of implementing a performance evaluation system on current security assistance programs?

## **C. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

### **1. Challenges to Public Sector Performance Evaluation**

The obstacles to public sector performance evaluation are primarily institutional, technical, and financial. Each of these obstacles presents a significant challenge to E-IMET performance evaluation.

#### ***a. Institutional Obstacles***

Institutional obstacles include the influence of political pressure on performance measurement, the effect of multiple self-interested constituencies on objectives consensus, and the lack of experience of government managers in dealing with

performance data. Each of these obstacles limits the ability of E-IMET officials to measure the effectiveness of the E-IMET program.

The E-IMET program has four diverse groups of stakeholders, all sharing in the management of the E-IMET program. The presence of so many powerful stakeholder groups makes the setting of a single set of security assistance objectives difficult. The Executive Office of the President sets national security assistance direction while the Congress, driven by their commitment to the Government Performance and Results Act, appropriates the funds necessary for the programs. Each has a different political stake in the performance of the E-IMET program. The Departments of State and Defense share responsibility for the management of the E-IMET program, but have potentially different financial stakes in the measurement of the program's effectiveness. Getting these groups to agree on a single set of objectives for security assistance and the E-IMET program is a challenge.

Compounding this problem is the fact that State and Defense Department official documents do not separate objectives from strategies. Fortunately, once the researcher separated objectives from strategies a common set of national security assistance objectives emerged. This consensus forms the objective baseline for future performance evaluation.

#### *b. Technical Obstacles*

Technical obstacles include differentiating between output and outcome measures, the need for several measures of performance for any one program, the lack of



standards for judging governmental performance, and the lack of timely performance feedback.

Due to the multi-faceted nature of the E-IMET program no single measure of performance is adequate. E-IMET officials must develop and implement multiple measures of performance simultaneously in order to provide Congress with the data required by the Results Act. Even with such a system, no standards exist that indicate whether the E-IMET intervention is “effective enough” to merit increased funding. Periodic performance reporting must be compared with an objective baseline assessment of a country’s political, judicial, and managerial characteristics (collected before the first E-IMET intervention) in order to attribute specific results to the E-IMET intervention.

Additionally, security assistance programs like E-IMET are often long-term intervention efforts. Such efforts often do not produce immediate results and are therefore not conducive to the immediacy of the GPRA reporting requirement.

*c. Financial Obstacles*

Implementation of performance measurement systems can be very costly, stretching the availability of financial and human resources. Systematically tracking the progression toward civilian control over the military, Western-style military justice systems, and improved defense resource management within a country requires the commitment of State and Defense Department assets. Funding for the IMET and E-IMET programs is already tiny relative to other discretionary programs. Implementing a comprehensive E-IMET performance evaluation system would likely absorb the very funding increases that the system is designed to capture. A comprehensive performance

measurement system implemented under current budgetary constraints would be difficult. DoD and DSCA must therefore adopt a performance evaluation system that is easy to use and can be implemented without additional funding.

## **2. Factors Limiting Rational-Analytic Assessment**

The chief factor limiting the objective assessment of E-IMET effectiveness is the inability to control external variables. It is difficult to separate the effects of the external environment from the E-IMET intervention. Security assistance officials will likely never be able to establish a concrete cause and effect relationship between the E-IMET intervention and a given result due to the presence of uncontrollable political and economic forces. They can, however, do a better job demonstrating to Congress a country's post-intervention progression toward the objectives of the E-IMET program.

Technically measuring the effects of the E-IMET program is also difficult. Quantifying the benefits that result from greater civilian control over the military, improved military justice systems, and more responsible defense resource management is very subjective. Further complicating this process is the lack of a clear definition of *improved defense resources management*. Neither DSCA nor the Department of State has clearly defined a desired endstate for the improved defense resource management objective. While the attributes of civilian control over the military and Western-style military justice systems are much easier to describe, the attributes of improved defense resource management are more ambiguous.

Another important limitation to the performance measurement process is the disjointedness of the government's security assistance organizations. In addition to the

obstacles created by the presence of multiple constituencies, the current bureaucratic structure of the security assistance community is a major impediment to the measuring process. The researcher agrees with a 1995 National Defense University study that observed:

The apportionment of responsibilities—system oversight (State), program management (Defense), and program requirements (Unified Commands, program teams, and foreign governments)...is inherently dysfunctional, creating the impression that IMET is a program without long-range benefit, one well-suited only for near-term displays of U.S. attention and associated “carrot and stick” diplomacy. This leads many in government to conclude that IMET is an expendable program (Cope, 1995, pp. 52-53).

The report added that:

Although international military education and training is a diplomatic-defense, or political-military, instrument of national security policy, INSS’s research found substantial agreement that the DoD has the greatest interest in and commitment to the IMET program. For the last 19 years, the State Department has dominated the process, while remaining ambivalent toward it, whereas Defense, without active sustained interest by staff principles, generally has deferred to State (Cope, 1995, p. 53).

The results of this study show that little has changed within the State and Defense Departments since 1995. Sharing responsibility for the IMET program and its expanded initiative between two major bureaucratic government agencies guarantees that performance measurement will fail to achieve its potential. Until the Departments of State and Defense streamline the program’s chain of responsibility and authority E-IMET performance evaluation will continue to be limited.

### **3. The E-IMET Performance Evaluation System**

A spectrum of approaches to the evaluation of public programs exists within the performance evaluation literature. Anchoring one end of the spectrum is the “technically rational paradigm” that treats performance measurement as an objective, scientific aid to decision-making. Anchoring the opposite end of the spectrum is the “politically rational paradigm” that emphasizes the effect of political power on the measurement of performance. Given the difficulties of technically measuring the effects of the E-IMET program, the politically rational paradigm was used to develop the following four-step E-IMET performance measurement process:

1. Identify the Key E-IMET Stakeholders;
2. Identify the Objectives of U.S. Security Assistance and the E-IMET Program;
3. Develop Performance Indices for the E-IMET Objectives;
4. Apply technically rational performance measurement techniques.

Only steps #1-3 were completed during this study. Due the researcher’s lack of access to country-specific E-IMET training data and security assistance officials, step #4 was beyond the scope of this study. In order to apply the E-IMET performance indices proposed in Chapter VI, DCSA must first conduct an objective baseline assessment in each country that receives E-IMET training. DSCA must then allow the in-country Security Assistance Officers (SAOs) to select the indicators of performance that are most applicable to their country’s current situation. Systematic reporting of progressions away

from the baseline assessment must follow in order to establish a stronger cause and effect relationship and meet the requirements of the Results Act.

#### **4. Implications of the E-IMET Performance Evaluation System**

Successfully measuring the performance of the E-IMET program has both internal and external implications for organizations like DSCA.

##### ***a. Internal Implications***

Requiring SAOs to systematically report on the progress toward greater civilian control over the military, improved military justice systems, and improved defense resources management is critical to the performance measurement effort. Information is only as good as its source, however. SAOs must be trained to recognize the indicators of performance and disciplined enough to consistently report them. Additionally, DSCA must be organized to receive the data and possess the processing capabilities necessary for the collection and dissemination of the information.

To date, security assistance officials have only been required to present anecdotal evidence to guarantee a future for their programs. Informal student opinions, the testimony of a key Unified Commander, and the remarks of an Ambassador or foreign official are examples of the anecdotal evidence used by security assistance officials to justify their programs. But the Results Act requires organizations like DSCA to *demonstrate* the results achieved. The application of a rigorous performance measurement system may be outside the experience of most security assistance managers. Understanding the limitations and challenges of a public sector performance evaluation system is crucial to making one work. Performance measurement systems like the one

designed in this study must be fully integrated with the strategic management of an organization. Inexperienced security assistance officials might see the results of their performance evaluation efforts simply as a report card and not as the strategic management tools that they are. Successfully evaluating the performance of an E-IMET intervention will determine if it is having the intended effect but it will not tell DSCA officials how to change it to make it more effective.

***b. External Implications***

The external implications of measuring the performance of security assistance programs are mixed. If the results are not favorable should one conclude that efforts to export democratic ideals are failing and should be stopped in order to save only 3% of the federal budget? Exporting democracy through security assistance training has traditionally been an effort based on faith—“train them and they will change.” Demonstrating results is foreign to the nature of security assistance program managers who do not discount non-quantifiable factors. Meeting the requirements of the Results Act could help solidify future congressional support but the emphasis on visible results might overshadow invisible ones. An imperfect E-IMET performance evaluation system must be used to reinforce the testimony of international affairs experts, not as a replacement for informed opinion.

**D. RECOMMENDATIONS**

**1. Recommendations for Further Action**

It is recommended that DSCA consider implementing the use of the performance indicators proposed in this study to measure the effectiveness of their E-IMET



intervention efforts. To do so, DSCA and in-country security assistance officials must build a country-specific Balanced Scorecard of performance indicators for each of the E-IMET objectives. A standard baseline assessment format must also be developed to provide the comparative foundation from which to measure the effectiveness of the E-IMET intervention. The training of the SAOs to recognize the indicators of performance and properly complete the baseline assessment must be a prerequisite of the system's implementation. Information resulting from the systematic reporting of progressions away from the baseline must then be gathered over time and presented as evidence for future funding decisions.

The researcher also recommends that DSCA and the Department of State clearly define an endstate for "improved defense resources management." A final result desired, as well as the desired attributes, must be communicated throughout DSCA. DSCA should solicit the help of Naval Postgraduate School academic professionals to build upon the researcher's definition and objectives hierarchy for improved defense resources management.

## **2. Recommendations for Further Study**

This study was completed without the input of regional experts. Building a Balanced Scorecard of E-IMET performance evaluation indicators requires a broad understanding of a country's civil-military traditions, existing military justice system, and defense resource management practices. The indicators of performance proposed in this study must be refined to fit the unique situations of specific countries. A baseline



assessment format must also be developed so that future progressions toward the objectives of the E-IMET program can be measured.

This study also did not consider alternatives for the delivery of the security assistance service. The researcher developed performance indices for the program as it currently exists. Now that performance indices have been proposed a cost-effectiveness comparison of alternatives is possible. Other alternatives for delivering security assistance training should be explored to determine the most efficient and effective method.

While not specifically addressed during this study, there are implications that the current apportionment of security assistance management responsibilities within the national government is inherently dysfunctional and basic IMET relationships need adjustment. DoD and DoS may need to streamline IMET management and budget planning, create a dedicated interdepartmental review council to oversee the entire program, and review the overarching policies that guide foreign military education. Further study is needed to determine whether current organizational relationships are appropriate and to determine the optimal apportionment of IMET responsibilities and authority.



## APPENDIX. DEFINITIONS

The following terms have been defined as listed below for the purposes of this study:

**Baseline Data:** Initial collection of data to establish a basis for comparison.

**Benchmark:** A standard or point of reference used in measuring and/or judging quality or value.

**Effectiveness:** The production of a decided, decisive, or desired effect.

**Efficiency:** The ratio of outputs to inputs in a process.

**Emerging Democracy:** A formerly non-democratic national government that seeks to implement broad-based democratic reforms. Examples include Poland, Hungary, and various former Soviet Republics such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

**External Stakeholder:** An individual or group outside the boundaries of the producing organization or program that receives or uses the output of the process.

**Internal Stakeholder:** An individual or group inside the boundaries of the producing organization or program that receives or uses the output from a previous stage or process to contribute to production of the final product or service.

**Measure:** One of several measurable values that contribute to the understanding and quantification of a performance indicator.

**Measurement System:** A system of practices, procedures, criteria, and standards that govern the collection of data (input), the analysis of the data (throughput), and the compilation of the results into quantitative or qualitative forms (output).

**Mobile Education Teams (METs):** A group of American-led professionals tasked to travel to a host country to conduct E-IMET courses. It should be noted that “METs” differ from the more commonly known military “MTTs” (Mobile *Training* Teams). METs are primarily civilian educators that teach military-to-civilian training courses, where MTTs are primarily military personnel who deliver military-to-military training.

**Objectives Hierarchy:** A useful approach to systematically link key stakeholders and their respective objectives to performance indicators. A hierarchy works down from a higher level objective to relevant sub-objectives, to specific attributes that characterize those sub-objectives, and finally to measurable characteristics that allow for the quantification of the desired attributes.

**Outcome Measurement:** An assessment of the results of a program activity as compared to its intended purpose. Outcome refers to the impact on society of a particular public sector activity and is closely related to the concept of effectiveness.

**Output Measurement:** The tabulation, calculation, or recording of an activity or effort. Output measurement traditionally refers to the quantity of the good or service provided, and is closely related to the concept of efficiency.

**Paradigm:** A systematic statement of the basic assumptions, concepts, and propositions employed by a school of analysis.

**Performance Goal:** A target level of an activity expressed as a tangible measurable objective, against which actual achievement can be compared.

**Performance Indicator:** A particular value or characteristic used to measure output or outcome.

**Performance Management:** The use of performance measurement information to help set agreed-upon performance goals, allocate and prioritize resources, inform managers to either confirm or change current policy or program directions to meet those goals, and report on the success in meeting those goals.

**Performance Measure:** A quantitative or qualitative characterization of performance.

**Performance Measurement:** A process of assessing progress toward achieving predetermined goals, including information on the efficiency with which resources are transformed into goods and services (outputs), the quality of those outputs (how well they are delivered to clients and the extent to which clients are satisfied), and outcomes (the results of a program activity compared to its intended purpose), and the effectiveness of government operations in terms of their specific contributions to program objectives.

**Performance-based Budgeting:** Budgeting initiatives designed to measure performance and link resources with results. The latest iteration in a series of Federal Government performance budgeting reforms is the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993.

**Political Rational Paradigm:** A paradigm that emphasizes the effect of political power on the measurement of performance.

**Process-Oriented Measurement System:** A measurement system whose purpose is to assess the attainment of the desired results, or outcomes, based on defined agency objectives.

**Program Performance Measurement:** The regular collection and reporting of a range of data including inputs, workload levels, outputs, and outcomes.

**Results-Oriented Measurement System:** A measurement system whose purpose is to assess the efforts to reengineer agency processes in order to achieve greater efficiency.

**Security Assistance:** The transfer of military and economic assistance to foreign governments through sale, grant, lease, or loan.

**Stake:** A claim on the organization or program that each stakeholder has. A stake may be tangible or intangible, explicit or implicit. A stake may also be political, economic, social, or psychological in nature.

**Stakeholder:** Any person, group, or organization that can place a claim on, or influence, the organization's or program's resources, outputs, or outcome; is affected by those outputs; or has an interest or expectation of the organization or program.

**Strategic Goal:** A long-range change target that guides an organization's efforts in moving toward a desired future state (also referred to as an "end").

**Strategic Objective:** A broad time-phased measurable accomplishment required to realize the successful completion of a strategic goal.

**Technical Rational Paradigm:** A paradigm that treats performance measurement as an objective, scientific aid to decision-making. Central to the application of this paradigm is the existence of objectives consensus and measurable costs and benefits. Examples include economic cost-benefit analysis, performance ratios, and linear programming models.



## LIST OF REFERENCES

### **Books:**

Allison, G.T., Essence of Decision, Little, Brown and Company, 1971.

Bovaird, T., "The Political Economy of Performance Measurement" in Organizational Performance and Measurement in the Public Sector, Quorum Books, 1996.

Byrne, J., "Policy Science and the Administrative State: The Political Economy of Cost-Benefit Analysis" in Confronting Values in Policy Analysis, Sage Publications, 1987.

Bracken, P., "Reconsidering Civil-Military Relations" in U.S.Civil-Military Relations In Crisis or Transition, The Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1995.

Cave, M., Kogan, M., and Smith, R. (Editors), Output and Performance Measurement in Government, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 1990.

Cope, J.A., International Military Education and Training: An Assessment (McNair Paper #44), National Defense University, October 1985.

Desch, M.C., "Threat Environments and Military Missions" in Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

Epstein, P.D., "Redeeming the Promise of Performance Measurement: Issues and Obstacles for Governments in the United States" in Organizational Performance and Measurement in the Public Sector, Quorum Books, 1996.

Fainstein, S.S., "The Politics of Criteria: Planning for the Redevelopment of Times Square" in Confronting Values in Policy Analysis, Sage Publications, 1987.

Freeman, E., Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, Pitman, 1984.

Greiner, J.M., "Positioning Performance Measurement for the Twenty-First Century" in Organizational Performance and Measurement in the Public Sector, Quorum Books, 1996.

Halachmi, A., and Bouckaert, G. (Editors), Organizational Performance and Measurement in the Public Sector, Quorum Books, 1996.

Hatry, H.P., "Foreword" in Organizational Performance and Measurement in the Public Sector, Quorum Books, 1996.

Heinman, R.A., The World of the Policy Analyst, Chatham House Publishers, 1990.



- Hitch, C.J., The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, Harvard University Press, 1960.
- Hitch, C.J., and McKean, R.N., Elements of Defense Economic, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1967.
- Hoos, I.R., Systems Analysis in Public Policy: A Critique, University of California Press, 1972.
- Huntington, S.P., "Reforming Civil-Military Relations" in Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
- Quade, E.S., Analysis for Public Decisions: 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Elsevier Science Publishing Company, 1982.
- Rainey, H.G., Understanding and Managing Public Organizations, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1991.
- Roberts, N.C., "Limitations of Strategic Action in Bureaus" in Public Management: The State of the Art, Jossey-Bass, 1993.
- Rummler, G.A., and Brache, A.P., Improving Performance: How to Manage the White Space on the Organizational Chart, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1995.
- Saaty, T.L., The Analytical Hierarchy Process, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1980.
- Sandler, T., and Hartley, K., The Economics of Defense, Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Segal, D.R., "U.S. Civil-Military Relations in the Twenty-first Century: A Sociologist's View" in U.S. Civil-Military Relations In Crisis or Transition, The Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1995.
- Smith, P.(Editor), Measuring Outcome in the Public Sector, Taylor & Francis Publishers, 1996.
- Webb, E.J., Campbell, D.T., Schwartz, R.D., and Sechrest, L.L., Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences, Rand McNally, 1966.
- Wholey, J.S., and Hatry, H.P., Handbook of Practical Program Evaluation, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992.
- Yaeger, S.J., "Classic Methods in Public Administration Research" in The Handbook of Public Administration, Marcel Dekker Publishers, 1989.

### **Newspapers and Journals:**

Avant, D., "Conflicting Indicators of 'Crisis' in American Civil-Military Relations." Armed Forces & Society, Vol. .24, pp. 375-388, Spring 1998.

Boschken, H.L., "Organizational Performance and Multiple Constituencies." Public Administration Review, pp. 308-312. May/June 1994.

Clarke, T., "The Stakeholder Corporation: A Business Philosophy for the Information Age." Long Range Planning, pp. 182-194, April 1998.

Cole, J., "Pentagon Cutbacks on Lockheed's F-22 Would Make Fighter's Cost Soar 50%," The Wall Street Journal, 7 July 1993.

Desch, M.C., "Soldiers, States, and Structures: The End of the Cold War and Weakening U.S. Civilian Control." The Armed Forces Forces & Society, Vol. 24, pp. 392-405. Spring 1998.

Kaplan, R.S., and Norton, D.P., "The Balanced Scorecard—Measures That Drive Performance," Harvard Business Review, pp. 71-79, January-February 1992.

King, P., and Roberts, N.C., "The Stakeholder Audit Goes Public." Organizational Dynamics, 1989.

Larson, C.R. Adm., "IMET: A Cornerstone of Cooperative Engagement," The DISAM Journal, pp. 96-102, Summer 1993.

Melese, F., Lowe, J., and Stroup, M., "Integrating Cost and Effectiveness: An Economic Perspective," Phalanx, pp. 13-17, September 1997.

U.S. Department of State, "The FY 1999 Security Assistance Budget Request," The DISAM Journal, pp. 15-36, Spring 1998.

### **Government Documents:**

Christopher, W. Secretary of State, "Foreign Assistance Priorities After the Cold War." Statement Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 31 May 1993.

Congressional Budget Office, "Using Performance Measures in the Federal Budget Process," July 1993.

Congressional Budget Office, "The Economic and Budget Outlook: An Update." September 1997.

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security Assistance, 14th Edition. April 1994.

Department of Defense, "GPRA Performance Plan for FY 1999," 1998.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy," 1998.

Moose, R., "Initiative to Reform U.S. International Affairs Program," Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 7 March 1994.

National Performance Review, "Benchmarking Report," June 1997.

National Security Council, "A National Security Strategy for A New Century," May 1997.

Secretary of Defense, "Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review," May 1997.

Secretary of State, Congressional Presentation on Foreign Operations, 1998.

Secretary of State, Congressional Presentation on Foreign Operations, 1999.

United States Congress, International Military Education and Training Legislation, pp. 134-135, 1991.

United States Congress, The Government Performance and Results Act, 5 January 1993.

United States General Accounting Office, "International Affairs Budget; Framework for Assessing Relevance, Priority, and Efficiency," October 1997.

United States General Accounting Office, "Foreign Affairs: Perspectives on Foreign Affairs Programs and Structures," November 1996.

United States General Accounting Office, "Security Assistance: Observations on Post Cold War Program Changes," September 1992.

**Websites:**

[www.dsaa.osd.mil](http://www.dsaa.osd.mil)

<http://freedom.house.gov/results>

<http://web.nps.navy.mil/~drmi>

Hayward, C., "The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993." [www.cottoncpa.com/gpra.htm](http://www.cottoncpa.com/gpra.htm), June 1998.

### **Interviews:**

Interview with D. Bonsper, Senior Lecturer, Defense Resources Management Institute, Naval Postgraduate School, and author, 29 October 1998.

Interview between J. Bowab, Chief, Resources Policy Division, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, and the author, 25 August 1998.

Interview between P. Stockton, Director of the Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, and the author, 8 October 1998.

Interview between R. Verry, International Training Policy Officer, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and the author, 26 August 1998.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Books:

Alexander, J.M. and Saaty, T.L., Conflict Resolution: The Analytic Hierarchy Approach, Praeger Publishers, 1989.

Dunn, W., Public Policy Analysis, Prentice-Hall, 1981.

McIsaac, J.F. and Verdugo, N., "Civil-Military Relations: A Domestic Perspective" in U.S.Civil- Military Relations In Crisis or Transition, The Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1995.

Mood, A.M., Introduction to Policy Analysis, Elsevier Science Publishing Company, 1983.

Norman, M. and Stoker, B., Data Envelopment Analysis: The Assessment of Performance, John Wiley & Sons, 1991.

Saaty, T.L. and Vargas, L.G., The Logic of Priorities, Kluwer Publishers, 1982.

Saaty, T.L., Decision Making For Leaders, RWS Publications, 1990.

Snider, DM. and Carlton-Carew, M.A., "The Current State of U.S. Civil-Military Relations: An Introduction" in U.S.Civil-Military Relations In Crisis or Transition, The Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1995.

Stokey, E. and Zeckhauser, R., A Primer for Policy Analysis, W.W. Norton & Company, 1978.

### Journals:

Behn, R.D., "Management by Groping Along," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, v.7, pp. 643-663, 1988.

Blackerly, P., "GPRA Strategic Planning: Start Here—How to Write a Plan-to-Plan." The Armed Forces Comptroller, pp. 21-41, Spring 1994.

Defense Security Assistance Agency, "Report to the United States Congress: Implementation of the Expanded IMET Initiative," The DISAM Journal, pp. 103-109, Summer 1993.

Grizzle, G.A., "Developing Standards for Interpreting Agency Performance: An Exploration of Three Models," Public Administration Review, pp. 128-33, March/April 1984.

- Kasper, R.J. Capt., "Expanded International Military Education and Training: Matching Military Means to Policy Ends," The DISAM Journal, pp. 77-86, Summer 1994.
- Kravchuk, R.S., and Schack, R.W., "Designing Effective Performance-Measurement Systems Under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993," Public Administration Review, p. 348, July/August 1996.
- Laurent, A., "Performance Anxiety," Government Executive, pp. 20-26, March 1998.
- Lindblom, C.E., "Still Muddling, Not Yet Through," Public Administration Review, pp. 517-526, November/December 1979.
- Lindblom, C.E., "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review, p. 88, Spring 1959.
- Maroni, A.C., "DoD Implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)," The Armed Forces Comptroller, pp. 23-26, Fall 1996.
- Peters, K., "High Stakes," Government Executive, pp. 17-24, July 1998.
- Samelson, L.J., "Fiscal Year 1998 Security Assistance Funding Allocations," The DISAM Journal, pp. 63-70, Spring 1998.
- Slocombe, W.B., "Support for the FY 1999 Security Assistance Budget Request," The DISAM Journal, pp. 56-59, Spring 1998.
- "The Department of State Today," The DISAM Journal, pp. 96-105, Winter 1992/1993.
- Wildavsky, A., "The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting," Public Administration Review, pp. 292-310, December 1966.

#### **Government Documents:**

- Ashford, D., "EIMET Executive Summary Trip Report: International Defense Acquisition Resources Management Program, Phase I Needs Assessment for the Czech Republic," 25 June 1998.
- Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, "Ecuador Phase III Executive Seminar Report, 23-27 March 1998," 30 April 1998.
- Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, "Rwanda Phase VI Executive Seminar Report, 21 Jul – 1 Aug 1997," 1 October 1997.
- Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, "South Africa Phase VIII Executive Seminar Report," 30 July 1998.



Defense Security Assistance Agency, DSAA Review Council Memorandum, 1 May 1998.

Defense Security Assistance Agency, Expanded IMET Handbook, February 1998.

McAffrey, B.R. Gen., "Southern Command: Upbeat Outlook, Some Linger Pitfalls," Prepared statement before the House National Security Committee, 8 March 1995.

Secretary of State, "Mission Program Plan—Process Guidance," March 1998.

Secretary of State, "Mission Program Plan—Substantive Guidance," March 1998.

United States Department of State, "U.S. Department of State FY 1999 Performance Plan," February 1998.

United States Department of State, "United States Strategic Plan for International Affairs," September 1997.

United States General Accounting Office, "Observations on the Department of Defense's Strategic Plan," 5 August 1997.

United States General Accounting Office, "Observations on the Department of State's Strategic Plan," 18 July 1997.

United States General Accounting Office, "Performance Budgeting: Past Initiatives Offer Insights for GPRA Implementation," March 1997.

United States General Accounting Office, "Promoting Democracy: Foreign Affairs and Defense Agencies Funds and Activities—1991 to 1993," January 1994.

United States General Accounting Office, "Security Assistance: Observations on the International Military Education and Training Program," June 1990.

#### **Interviews:**

Interview between J. Bond, LtCol, USAF, IMET Program Manager, Resources Policy Division, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, and the author, 25 August 1998.

Interview between K. Judkins, IMET Coordinator, Middle East, Asia, North Africa Directorate, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and the author, 26 August 1998.

Interview between J. Scaramozzino, Captain, USN, Director of the International Health Resources Management Program and Dr. P. Fields, Professor, Naval Postgraduate School, and the author, 6 October 1998.

Interview between Walker Roberts, Majority Staffer, House International Relations Committee, U.S. Congress, and the author, 26 August 1998.

Interview between G. Sauders, LtCol., USA, Office of the Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) and the author, 20 August 1998.

Interview between W. Munroe, Academic Director, Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, and the author, 8 October 1998.

## INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center .....2  
8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite 0944  
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218
  
2. Dudley Knox Library .....2  
Naval Postgraduate School  
411 Dyer Road  
Monterey, CA 93943-5101
  
3. Director, Training and Education.....1  
MCCDC, Code C46  
1019 Elliot Rd.  
Quantico, VA 22134-5027
  
4. Director, Marine Corps Research Center .....2  
MCCDC, Code C40RC  
2040 Broadway Street  
Quantico, VA 22134-5107
  
5. Director, Studies and Analysis Division.....1  
MCCDC, Code C45  
300 Russell Rd.  
Quantico, VA 22134-5130
  
6. Marine Corps Representative.....1  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Code 037, Bldg. 234, HA-220  
699 Dyer Road  
Monterey, CA 93940
  
7. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity .....1  
Technical Advisory Branch  
Attn: Maj. J.C. Cummiskey  
Box 555171  
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055-5080
  
8. Prof. Nancy C. Roberts (Code SM/Rc).....1  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, CA 93943-5103

9.	Prof. Francois Melese .....	1
	Naval Postgraduate School	
	Defense Resources Management Institute (DRMI)	
	Monterey, CA 93940	
10.	CAPT James Scaramozzino (Code OI).....	1
	101 North St.	
	Bldg. 211	
	Monterey, CA 93943	
11.	Prof. Paul Fields (Code OI) .....	1
	101 North St.	
	Bldg. 211	
	Monterey, CA 93943	
12.	Ms. Rita Verry .....	2
	Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)	
	111 Jefferson Davis Hwy.	
	Crystal Gateway North	
	Suite 303E	
	Arlington, VA 22202	
13.	Mr. Joe Bowab.....	1
	(ATTN: LTCol Joe Bond, USAF)	
	Bureau of Political-Military Affairs	
	U.S. Department of State	
	2201 C St. NW	
	Washington, DC 20520	
14.	Captain Todd Calhoun, USMC.....	2
	108 N. Donald	
	Arlington Heights, IL 60004	















DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY



3 2768 00368127 1